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ABSTRACT 
The three chapters presented in this dissertation focus on fiscal issues affecting developing 
countries.  Low tax revenue collection, weak enforcement capabilities, high levels of tax evasion, 
inefficient tax system design, and reactive handling of contingent liabilities –such as natural 
disasters–, are characteristics commonly observed in countries across the developing world.  In the 
analyses presented here, I study some of these issues and seek to contribute to their understanding 
through new empirical evidence.   
Chapter 1: Minimum taxes are attractive to governments because under such regimes evasion 
incentives are expected to be lower than under profit taxation. Until recently, this type of policies 
was considered suboptimal from a social welfare perspective.  The present analysis focuses on the 
Guatemalan corporate income tax regime faced by firms registered in Regimen Optativo.  The 
empirical evidence shown in this chapter suggests strong firm responses to the minimum tax and 
to its exemption rule, most of which seem in accordance with evasion behavior. Upper-bounds for 
average reported profits are estimated to be as low as 42% of actual firms’ profits, implying an 
evasion rate of 58% in the absence of the minimum tax scheme. These results are consistent with 
the view that minimum taxes can be an effective mechanism to lower tax evasion in environments 
with limited enforcement capabilities.   
Chapter 2: This chapter analyses the fiscal impact of extreme weather events.  While the literature 
analyzing the economic incidence of natural disasters has mainly focused on their macroeconomic 
consequences, the fiscal dimension of this problem remains relatively neglected.  Due to their 
xii 
 
 
adverse effect on the economy, extreme weather events tend to reduce government revenues and 
increase public expenditure, creating a negative pressure on the budget balance.  According to the 
results shown in this chapter, the occurrence of at least one extreme weather event is associated 
with an increase in the budget deficit between 0.4% and 0.9% of GDP. This impact comes 
primarily from an immediate reduction in government revenues, as a percentage of GDP, with 
some evidence pointing out to a lagged effect on public expenditure two years after the event.  The 
analysis also shows that the fiscal effect is larger for low-income and lower-middle income 
countries but is not significant for high-income and upper-middle income countries. 
Chapter 3: This chapter explores the consequences of having two co-existing corporate income tax 
regimes within a domestic tax system. This scenario is interesting because, in such environments, 
a simple theoretical model predicts an optimal strategy involving tax arbitrage through income 
shifting across regimes.  The empirical exercise focuses on the case of Guatemala, where firms 
choose between a regime that taxes profits –Regimen Optativo–, and a regime that taxes turnover 
–Regimen General–.  Following a difference-in-difference approach, where treatment and control 
groups are defined by whether firms belong to a tax arbitrage network or not, the results show 
differential behavior between the two groups.  Firms that do not belong to a tax arbitrage network 
faced a decrease of around one percentage point more than the treatment group in the probability 
of registering in Regimen General after the reform.  Despite their consistency with the theoretical 
predictions, it is acknowledged that these results should only be interpreted as indirect evidence of 
profit shifting and the existence of tax arbitrage networks in Guatemala. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Firms’ (mis)reporting under a minimum tax: Evidence from Guatemalan 
corporate tax returns 
 
1.1. Introduction 
It is well documented that, despite similar statutory tax rates, developing countries have relatively 
low tax revenues in comparison to the developed world. For instance, in 2010 the average tax-to-
GDP ratio in low income countries was 13.0%, in contrast with the OECD mean of 35.4%.  The 
difference is particularly striking when comparing income tax collection, which represented 12.9% 
of GDP in OECD countries, while only reaching 3.5% in low income countries (IMF, 2011).  Such 
a reality points at significant limitations in the ability of developing countries to collect taxes, and 
several studies have discussed different dimensions of this problem, including informality and tax 
evasion (e.g. Gordon and Li, 2009; IDB, 2013; Beasly and Persson, 2014). 
This paper studies firm behavior under a minimum tax scheme in the context of a 
developing country.  Minimum taxes are a form of taxation that calculates the amount a taxpayer 
owes using alternative bases (e.g. profits, turnover), levying the largest liability of the two.  These 
schemes are attractive to governments in advanced and developing economies because under such 
regimes evasion incentives are expected to be lower than under profit taxation, hence increasing 
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tax collection.1  Until recently, this type of policies was considered suboptimal from a social 
welfare perspective, due to their distortionary nature.  However, new research has shed some light 
into this issue (Best et al., 2015).   
The specific focus of this paper is the Guatemalan corporate income tax regime faced by 
firms registered in Regimen Optativo.  This regime features a minimum tax scheme in which firms 
pay the largest tax liability between a tax on profits and a tax on turnover.  As shown in the paper, 
the kink in the tax liability function created by this policy induces bunching behavior among firms, 
which allows for the identification of evasion responses (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011).  
Moreover, Regimen Optativo also features an exemption rule, based on the firm’s cost structure, 
as well as no loss carryforward.  The former trait causes a firm-specific upward notch in the tax 
liability function, while the latter generates an additional kink, similar to the one provoked by the 
minimum tax.2  The differentiated misreporting incentives that arise as a result of these kinks and 
notch provide helpful variation, which is exploited in the paper to identify behavior consistent with 
evasion strategies. 
The present study contributes to the growing literature focusing on firms’ behavior in 
developing countries in three ways.  First, it focuses on the analysis of exemption rules and their 
impact within the framework of a minimum tax scheme. To the best of the author’s knowledge, a 
systematic approach to this issue has not been attempted in any previous studies.  Using previously 
unexplored Guatemalan administrative data, the empirical analysis demonstrates that firms react 
                                                          
1 Some examples include Bolivia, Cambodia, Cameroon, Chad, Colombia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Gabon, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Ivory Coast, Liechtenstein, Madagascar, Mauritius, Nicaragua, Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Panama, Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Slovakia, South Korea, Tanzania, and the United States. (see 
Price-Waterhouse-Coopers, 2014). 
2 In this context, a kink occurs when there is a discontinuous change in the tax rate, but not in the tax liability.  Instead, 
a notch represents a discontinuous change in the level of the tax liability. 
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strongly to the incentives created by this type of notch, strategically misreporting specific cost 
categories to become exemption-eligible.  Second, this paper provides new empirical evidence in 
support of the use of minimum taxes as a tool to increase tax revenue.  Estimates obtained from 
bunching analysis suggest that the minimum tax induces firms to reduce misreporting, as a 
proportion of reported profits, by as much as 137%.  Third, the paper exploits the no loss 
carryforward rule of Regimen Optativo to derive a method that allows the estimation of upper 
bounds for the ratio of reported-to-actual profits.  According to these calculations, firms report, on 
average, no more than 42% of their true profits in the absence of the minimum tax scheme.  This 
number implies that evasion arising from profit misreporting would be at least 58% of actual 
profits if this scheme was not in place.  The large estimated rate of evasion is consistent with other 
estimates found in the literature for developing countries.3 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 introduces the theoretical model 
used throughout the analysis.  Section 3 provides a description of the Guatemalan income tax and 
the dataset.  Section 4 discusses the methodology which guides the empirical analysis, with results 
presented in Section 5.  Finally, the conclusions of the paper are summarized in Section 6. 
1.2. Theoretical Model 
This section develops the theoretical framework needed to understand a minimum tax scheme, as 
well as the implications of introducing an exemption rule into this setup.  It starts by separately 
describing optimal firm behavior under a pure profit tax and a turnover tax.  Then, building on 
                                                          
3 For instance, Bachas and Soto (2017) estimate that evasion could be as large as 70% of actual firm profits in the case 
of Costa Rica. Similarly, Pecho et al. (2012) present estimates of income tax non-compliance in Latin America ranging 
between 34.5% and 72%. 
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those cases, it presents a model where firms face a minimum tax.  Finally, the model is expanded 
to account for the introduction of an exemption rule.     
1.2.1. Profit maximization under a pure profits tax 
The basic model used in this paper is an extension of the canonical income tax model (Allingham 
and Sandmo, 1972) in which firms maximize profits, taking into account a tax liability function, 
as well as the expected benefits and costs of evasion.  The tax liability faced by firms,  𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?), 
depends on output  𝑦  and reported cost  ?̂?. 4, 5  As is common in the literature, the model assumes 
that firms face total costs  𝑐(𝑦)  that are a convex function of output; private costs of evasion  
ℎ(?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦))  that are a convex function of misreported cost; and, as is the case in the developing 
world, imperfect enforcement.6  Hence, the firm’s problem is, 
 max
𝑦, 𝑐̂ 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?) − ℎ(?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)). (1) 
For the case of a pure profits tax with a marginal rate  𝜏𝜋, the tax liability function becomes  
𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?) = 𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − ?̂?).  The key feature of such a scheme is that firms can fully deduct costs from 
their turnover, in order to determine their taxable income.  The firm’s first order conditions for an 
interior solution are, 
 𝑐′(𝑦)[1 − ℎ′(?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦))] = 1 − 𝜏𝜋 (2) 
                                                          
4 The terms output and turnover are used interchangeably in this study.  This follows from a normalization of the price 
level, which simplifies the exposition of the problem. 
5 For simplicity, firms can only misreport cost in this framework.  However, the model can be extended to account for 
turnover misreporting without changing the basic results presented in this section.  See the appendix to this chapter 
for a model with such a representation. 
6 The choice of the private costs of evasion as a convex function of misreported cost, ℎ(𝑐̂ − 𝑐(𝑦)), mirrors the typical 
penalty structure observed in many tax systems around the world.  Moreover, it also replicates the penalty structure 
of the Guatemalan tax system, which will be the subject of analysis in the empirical section. 
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 ℎ′(?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 𝜏𝜋. (3) 
Optimal evasion is governed by equation (3), which indicates that firms will engage in tax 
evasion by misreporting costs, up to the point where the marginal cost of doing so equals the tax 
rate.7  Furthermore, in this simplified model, combining equations (2) and (3) yields, 
 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1. (4) 
This condition implies that a pure profits tax is non-distortionary, since the determination of the 
optimal output level is independent of the tax rate.8  Therefore, under this scheme, if the 
government decides to increase the tax rate, firms will react by adjusting their level of cost 
misreporting,  ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦), without altering their output decision.  In other words, any observed 
behavioral response would map directly to a change in the firm’s evasion pattern, as there is no 
real (i.e. output) response in this framework. 
1.2.2. Profit maximization under a turnover tax 
An alternative approach to profits taxation often observed in developing countries is turnover 
taxation.  The main difference with the pure profits tax setting is that this type of taxation does not 
allow for costs deduction.  In this context, the tax liability function takes the form  𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?) = 𝜏𝑦𝑦,  
where  𝜏𝑦  represents the tax rate on turnover.  The first order conditions for an interior solution to 
this problem are, 
                                                          
7 The dependence of the level of misreporting on the tax rate relies on the specification of  ℎ(?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)), as discussed 
in the literature (Yitzhaki, 1974; Cremer and Gahvari, 1994; Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002). The result in equation (3) 
is consistent with a setting in which the probability of detection is an increasing function of the evaded amount.  It is 
also consistent with a scenario in which there are variable costs of evasion on top of the expected penalty incurred if 
caught by the tax authority. 
8 The characterization of a profit tax as non-distortionary is used for tractability.  However, this is not in agreement 
with the empirical evidence. See Auerbach et al. (2008) for an example of this literature.  
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 𝑐′(𝑦)[1 − ℎ′(?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦))] = 1 − 𝜏𝑦 (5) 
 ℎ′(?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 0, (6) 
which together imply, 
 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝜏𝑦. (7) 
 Contrary to the pure profits tax, a turnover tax has a distortionary effect, as equation (7) 
relates the optimal output level to the tax rate.  As a consequence, a firm under this tax regime will 
produce less output than under a profit tax.  Moreover, the firm will not engage in tax evasion via 
cost misreporting, as the marginal benefit of this action would be zero.9 
1.2.3. Profit maximization under a minimum tax 
The previous two cases serve as the foundation for the analysis of firm behavior under a minimum 
tax scheme (MTS).  These types of schemes find their rationale in the fact that firms have no 
incentives to misreport costs whenever they face a turnover tax, hence, reducing evasion.10   
A typical minimum income tax liability function has the form,11 
 𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?) = max{𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − ?̂?), 𝜏𝑦𝑦}. (8) 
                                                          
9 In this model, the possibility of turnover misreporting is ignored for simplicity.  See the appendix to this chapter for 
a model that incorporates this margin of evasion.  The main results are unchanged, as turnover misreporting also 
decreases with respect to its level under a profit tax, as long as the tax rate on turnover is lower than the tax rate on 
profits. 
10 The cost of reducing evasion using a minimum tax comes from the distortion to production incentives.  Nonetheless, 
Best et al. (2015) show that minimum taxes can be more socially efficient than profit taxes in environments with low 
enforcement. 
11 Examples of this type of tax liability function are provided by Best et al. (2015) for the case of Pakistan, and 
Mosberger (2016) for the case of Hungary.  In the empirical section, the Guatemalan corporate tax regime will be 
added to this list, but there are many other similar schemes around the world. 
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Equation (8) indicates that a firm faces the largest tax liability between a profit tax and a turnover 
tax.  For a given combination of output and reported cost, (𝑦, ?̂?), the two liabilities are equal when, 
 𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − ?̂?) =  𝜏𝑦𝑦        ⇔         ?̂? ≡
(𝑦−𝑐̂)
𝑦
=  
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
. (9) 
Here,  ?̂?  is known as the reported (pre-tax) profit margin.  The value  𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄  –referred to as the 
MTS payment threshold, from this point onwards– defines which tax liability is higher.  Firms 
reporting a profit margin lower than the MTS payment threshold face a turnover tax, while those 
reporting a larger profit margin are required to pay a tax on profits.  This means that the incentives 
for a profit-maximizing firm change depending on whether it locates to the left or the right of the 
MTS payment threshold.  Figure 1.1 provides a graphical representation of how a minimum tax 
scheme works. 
In order to have a better understanding of how firm behavior is affected by a minimum tax, 
let us suppose that we start in a scenario with a pure profit tax.  Under this regime, a firm with a 
reported profit margin below the MTS threshold would locate on the profit tax liability function 
(dashed line), as shown by point A in Figure 1.2.12  At that point, there is no tax distortion to output 
and evasion is positive, in line with equations (3) and (4).  If the tax regime suddenly changed to 
a minimum tax scheme, the firm would face a higher tax liability.  Before accounting for any 
response, the firm would find itself at point B in the figure.  However, given the new tax incentives, 
the firm will respond by decreasing output and reducing evasion, in accordance with equations (6) 
and (7).  As a result, the firm’s reported profit margin will increase, and the firm will locate at 
                                                          
12 Throughout this paper, the term “tax liability function” may also be used (imprecisely, admittedly) to refer to the 
function  𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?)/𝑦.  This is mainly done so when describing the tax liability function as a proportion of turnover in 
the different figures presented in the study. 
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point C.13  In aggregate, firms’ responses will create bunching in the density distribution at the 
MTS threshold, as illustrated in Panel (b) of Figure 1.2. 
Contrary to the case shown in Figure 1.2, firms with an initial reported profit margin above 
the MTS payment threshold will not show any behavioral response.  This is because their 
incentives remain unchanged after the introduction of the minimum tax scheme.  Thus, under the 
new regime, the overall tax revenue gains from lower evasion, as well as the efficiency costs from 
distorting production, are all coming from firms with an initial reported profit margin below the 
MTS payment threshold. 
1.2.4. Implications of adding an exemption rule to the MTS 
An implicit assumption of the minimum tax framework developed above is that all firms are 
required to pay the minimum tax, provided that their profit margin lies below the MTS payment 
threshold.  However, in practice, it is not uncommon to find schemes that exempt a group of firms 
from facing the minimum tax.  As it is shown below, accounting for exemption rules is important 
because of their effect on tax incentives.  When an exemption rule is available, firms take into 
consideration their eligibility prospects at the time of making output and evasion decisions. 
The previous model can be expanded to account for the effects of an exemption rule.  Let  
𝜃  be a binary parameter that defines whether a firm is exempt or not, with  𝜃 = 1  if the firm is 
eligible for a minimum tax exemption, and  𝜃 = 0  if the firm is non-exempt.  The tax liability 
function under this scheme is, 
                                                          
13 The reported profit margin can be written as  ?̂? =
𝑦−𝑐(𝑦)
𝑦
−
𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦)
𝑦
.  The first term corresponds to the firm’s “true” 
profit margin and is decreasing in output under the assumption of decreasing returns to scale.  The second term captures 
the evasion component and is increasing in misreported cost.  Thus, if a firm reduces both its output and misreported 
cost, its reported profit margin will increase. 
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 𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?) = 𝜃𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − ?̂?) + (1 − 𝜃) max{𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − ?̂?), 𝜏𝑦𝑦}. (10) 
Equation (10) is equivalent to equation (8) whenever a firm is non-exempt, and it reverts into a 
pure profits tax if a firm is exempt.   
 In order to fully appreciate the implications of the new setup on the tax liability function, 
it is convenient to consider different specifications of this exemption rule.   The next subsections 
will analyze two broad categories of exemption rules, which create a notch in the tax liability 
function.   
1.2.4.1. Exemption rules that create an upward notch in the tax liability function 
Suppose, for simplicity, that the government defines the exemption rule according to the following 
condition, 
  𝜃 ≡ { 
0,      
𝑦−𝑐̂
𝑦
> 𝜑
1,      
𝑦−𝑐̂
𝑦
≤ 𝜑.
  (11) 
This definition indicates that firms are exempt if their profit margin is less or equal to an exogenous 
value  𝜑  –the MTS exemption threshold–, but are non-exempt otherwise.14  
It is useful to point out that equation (11) provides a condition that is similar in nature to 
equation (9), insofar it relates the MTS exemption threshold to the profit margin.15  However, both 
conditions differ in a fundamental manner.  One way to think about the separate roles of the MTS 
exemption and payment thresholds is to view the former as a parameter defining the intention to 
                                                          
14 The specification of this exemption rule is based on a simplified version of the Guatemalan case, which is analyzed 
in the empirical section.   
15 The use of the profit margin in equation (11) to define the exemption rule is deliberate. In practice, these rules may 
not be stated in terms of the profit margin.  However, the basic results of this section remain the same, as long as there 
is a mapping between the statistic that defines the exemption rule and the profit margin.   
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treat, and the latter as the actual treatment determinant.  For instance, a firm with a reported profit 
margin above the MTS exemption threshold will be non-exempt, but it will only pay the minimum 
tax if its profit margin is below the MTS payment threshold.  On the other hand, a firm with a 
reported profit margin below the MTS exemption threshold is, by definition, exempt, which means 
it is not subject to pay the minimum tax, independently of whether its profit margin lies above or 
below the MTS payment threshold. 
Figure 1.3 illustrates the consequences of such an exemption rule on the shape of the tax 
liability function.  There are two cases to consider, each depending on how the MTS exemption 
threshold relates to the MTS payment threshold.  Panel (a) shows that when  𝜑 ≥
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
   the tax 
liability function reverts to that of a pure profits tax. This occurs because all firms that would be 
subject to pay the minimum tax are exempt from doing so, rendering the MTS payment threshold 
irrelevant.16  The second case arises when  𝜑 <
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
  and is depicted in panel (b).  In this situation, 
there is an upward notch in the tax liability function exactly at the MTS exemption threshold.  
Firms with a profit margin below  𝜑  avoid the minimum tax, but those with a higher profit margin 
must pay it if they also lie to the left of the MTS payment threshold.   
Clearly, in both cases the existence of an exemption rule has important implications on the 
impact of a minimum tax scheme on firm behavior.  For instance, a firm facing the tax liability 
function in panel (a) will not have incentives to bunch at the MTS payment threshold.  However, 
if it faces the tax liability function in panel (b), the firm will evaluate its best alternative –that 
which maximizes after-tax profits– between two options.  The first one is to respond to the kink at 
                                                          
16 In this highly stylized framework, this case seems trivial, as no government would create an exemption rule that 
effectively dismantles their minimum tax scheme.  However, in practice, the MTS exemption threshold can be firm-
specific, when considered in terms of the profit margin.  The Guatemalan minimum tax scheme analyzed in the 
empirical section provides an example where this is the case. 
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the MTS payment threshold, in which case the firm will follow the path from points A to C, 
increasing its reported profit margin.  A firm choosing this path will bunch at the MTS payment 
threshold in the same fashion as in Figure 1.2.  The second alternative is to respond to the notch at 
the MTS exemption threshold.  If it chooses to do so, the firm will adjust its output and evasion 
choices so that its reported profit margin drops to point C’, where the firm is now exempt from 
paying the minimum tax.  In this latter case, firms will bunch to the left of the MTS exemption 
threshold.17 
1.2.4.2. Exemption rules that create a downward notch in the tax liability function 
Now, let us consider an alternative case, where the government inverts the exempt and non-exempt 
groups by defining the rule as follows, 
  𝜃 = { 
0,      
𝑦−𝑐̂
𝑦
< 𝜑
1,      
𝑦−𝑐̂
𝑦
≥ 𝜑.
  (12) 
Contrary to (11), in this setting firms are exempt from the minimum tax scheme if their profit 
margin is greater or equal to the MTS exemption threshold,  𝜑, but remain non-exempt otherwise.18  
The implications of this simple change in the eligibility rule are presented in Figure 1.4. 
As in the case of the previous subsection, there are two cases to consider.  Panel (a) shows 
that when  𝜑 ≥
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
   the MTS tax liability function remains unaffected by the exemption rule. This 
is because all the exempt firms are to the right of the MTS payment threshold, meaning that they 
                                                          
17 For cases where the MTS exemption threshold is firm-specific in terms of the reported profit-margin, as in the 
empirical section, this bunching will not be evident in the corresponding density distribution.  This occurs because 
every firm faces the notch at a different value of the profit margin. 
18 This specification is based on a simplified version of the Hungarian case, which is analyzed by Mosberger (2016).   
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did not have to pay the minimum tax even in the absence of the exemption rule.19  Panel (b) 
presents the case when  𝜑 <
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
 .  In this scenario, there is a downward notch in the tax liability 
function exactly at the MTS exemption threshold.  Firms with a reported profit margin below  𝜑  
are non-exempt and face the minimum tax, but those with a higher profit margin are exempt.  While 
firms in panel (a) have incentives to bunch at the MTS payment threshold, moving from points A 
to C, those in panel (b) face incentives to bunch at the MTS exemption threshold, repositioning 
from points A to C’. 
1.3. Context and Data 
1.3.1. Guatemalan income tax and minimum tax scheme 
As mentioned earlier in this study, one of the reasons why the analysis of taxpayer behavior is 
important for developing countries is their persistently low tax revenues.  Guatemala represents an 
example of this reality.  With a tax-to-GDP ratio averaging 11% in recent years –of which income 
tax is only about 2% of GDP–, the difficulties surrounding tax collection are a central aspect of 
the country’s fiscal policy.  Evasion levels are believed to be high, given the legal and financial 
limitations of the tax authority, with some estimates placing the rates of noncompliance for income 
tax and VAT around 40% and 35%, respectively (ICEFI, 2015).  
Guatemala’s corporate income tax law allows taxpayers to choose between two schemes, 
Regimen General and Regimen Optativo, with the former being a tax on turnover and the latter a 
tax on profits with a minimum tax (i.e. a minimum tax scheme of the type shown in section 2).  
                                                          
19 As was the case of panel (a) in Figure 1.3, this seems trivial, as no government would be expected to implement an 
exemption rule that has no relevance.  Nevertheless, this can occur inadvertently for some firms if the MTS exemption 
threshold is firm-specific, when expressed in terms of the profit margin.  The Hungarian exemption rule to their 
minimum tax scheme provides an example of such a setup. 
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According to data from Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria (SAT), Guatemala’s tax 
authority, approximately 60% of corporate income tax is collected from Regimen Optativo 
(Franco, 2011).   
In this paper, the analysis is restricted to firms filing under Regimen Optativo.  In this 
regime, firms must pay a tax on profits, with a marginal rate of 31%, if their reported profit margin 
is at least 3% of reported turnover.  Firms reporting a profit margin below this threshold, pay a 
minimum tax equivalent to 0.93% of their turnover.20  Additionally, there is an exemption rule 
based on a firm’s reported gross margin, a measure that subtracts the direct cost of goods sold 
(COGS) from turnover but does not consider the costs of services sold.21  Firms with a gross margin 
larger than 4% of turnover are non-exempt, while firms with a lower gross margin are eligible to 
claim the exemption.  In order to fully obtain the exemption, qualified firms must also submit a 
series of legal and accounting documents at least two months before the filing deadline for annual 
income tax returns.22 
Finally, it is important to remark that Guatemala’s corporate income tax regimes do not 
allow loss-carryforward.  Table 1.1 summarizes the main features of corporate income taxation 
under Regimen Optativo. 
1.3.2. Data 
                                                          
20 The tax rate on profits and the minimum tax changed after 2012, following a tax reform.  The data used in this 
analysis is unaffected by these adjustments, as it does not cover the post-reform period. 
21 The gross margin is regarded as a measure of how a firm’s production costs relate to its turnover.  The cost of goods 
sold (COGS) refers to the direct costs attributable to the production of the goods sold by a company. This amount 
includes the cost of the materials used in creating the good along with the direct labor costs used to produce the good. 
It excludes indirect expenses such as distribution costs and sales force costs. 
22 Among the required documentation, firms must submit an affidavit and externally-audited financial statements. 
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The data used in this paper comes from a novel panel database of Guatemalan tax administrative 
records. This dataset contains the universe of corporate income tax returns filed annually under 
Regimen Optativo for the years 2006 to 2012.  Since the units of analysis in this paper are all firms 
filing in this regime, individual taxpayers are not considered in the sample.   
Consistency checks were carried out to ensure basic reliability of the data, which resulted 
in some observations being dropped.  Firms reporting revenues from exports are not considered 
due to the impossibility to distinguish which of them are eligible for income tax exemption under 
Guatemalan tax law.23 The total number of observation points remaining after filtering is 133,122, 
which corresponds to an average of about 19,000 firms per year.  Table 1.2 provides summary 
statistics for the final sample under analysis. 
1.4. Empirical Strategy  
Based on the theoretical framework developed earlier in this paper, this section adapts the model 
to the case of the Guatemalan corporate income tax scheme.  It starts by describing the scheme’s 
tax liability function and exemption rule in a form comparable to those shown in Section 2.  Then, 
it analyzes the expected behavioral responses of firms in this setting, yielding a set of testable 
predictions from the model.  Finally, it describes the bunching methodology used to estimate firms’ 
responses from the empirical data. 
1.4.1. Tax liability function and exemption rule under Regimen Optativo 
In terms of the model described in Section 2, the main features of the Guatemalan minimum tax 
scheme can be incorporated into a tax liability function with the following form, 
                                                          
23 Exporting firms were, on average, approximately 2,000 per year, for a total of 13,529 observations. 
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 𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆, ?̂?𝑜) = 𝜃 max{𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − ?̂?𝑜), 0} + (1 − 𝜃) max{𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − ?̂?𝑜), 𝜏𝑦𝑦}
 (13) 
where, 
  𝜃 ≡ { 
0,      
𝑦−𝑐̂𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
𝑦
> 4%
1,      
𝑦−𝑐̂𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
𝑦
≤ 4%.
  (14) 
Here, the variable  ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆  incorporates the firm’s reported cost of goods sold (COGS), while the 
variable ?̂?𝑜 ≡ ?̂? − ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆, referred to as “other” costs, is defined as the difference between total 
reported costs and reported COGS.  Notice that, in the first term of equation (13), the inability of 
exempt firms to carry forward net operating losses creates, in practice, a kink in the tax liability 
function at  ?̂? = 0.24  The second term of the tax function in equation (13) describes the tax liability 
faced by non-exempt firms.  As in the theoretical framework, this term generates a kink at the MTS 
payment threshold, which in this context occurs at  ?̂? = 𝜏𝑦 𝜏𝜋⁄ = 0.93%/31% = 3%.   
 A feature of the exemption rule in equation (14) is that it is expressed in terms of the 
reported gross margin, ?̂? ≡
𝑦−𝑐̂𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
𝑦
.  However, in order to reconcile this rule with the theoretical 
framework, equation (14) needs to be considered in terms of the profit margin, which is the statistic 
that matters to determine the tax base.  This transformation yields, 
  𝜃 = { 
0,          
𝑦−𝑐̂𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆−𝑐?̂?
𝑦
> 4% −
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
1,          
𝑦−𝑐̂𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆−𝑐?̂?
𝑦
≤ 4% −
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
.
  (15) 
                                                          
24 The figures presented in Section 2 incorporated this feature; however, for simplicity, the equations representing the 
theoretical tax liability functions did not. 
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The key difference between equation (15) and equation (11) –its theoretical equivalent– is 
that, in this case, the MTS exemption threshold is firm-specific, as  𝜑(𝑦, ?̂?𝑜) = 4% −
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
.  
Therefore, firms for which  𝜑(𝑦, ?̂?𝑜) ≥ 3%  will face a tax liability function as in panel (a) of 
Figure 1.3.  Instead, for firms with 𝜑(𝑦, ?̂?𝑜) < 3%, a tax liability function of the type depicted in 
panel (b) of the same figure will apply. 
To facilitate the understanding of how a firm-specific MTS exemption threshold affects 
the tax function, it is helpful to see these features graphically.  Figure 1.5 shows the implications 
of this exemption rule on the Guatemalan minimum tax scheme.  Panel (a) depicts the tax liability 
function faced by firms, ignoring the effects of the exemption rule.  The figure is equivalent to 
Figure 1.1, with a MTS payment threshold at 3%.  On the other hand, panel (b) incorporates the 
relationship between the firm’s reported profit margin and its reported “other” costs, ?̂?𝑜, as implied 
by the exemption rule in equation (15).  As it can be seen, the resulting tax function is somewhat 
complex.  In terms of their cost structure, firms can be allocated into one of three groups.25  Firms 
with  
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
≤ 1%  face a pure profits tax with a kink at  ?̂? = 0, created by the no loss carryforward 
rule.   Those with  1% <
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
≤ 4%  face a kink at the MTS payment threshold, a notch at the firm-
specific MTS exemption threshold,  𝜑(𝑦, ?̂?𝑜), and a second kink at ?̂? = 0, which basically 
reproduce the tax liability function of panel (b) in Figure 1.3.  Finally, firms with  
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
> 4%  only 
face a kink at the MTS payment threshold and a notch at  𝜑(𝑦, ?̂?𝑜), with the latter located at 
negative values of the firm’s reported profit margin.  The substantial heterogeneity generated by 
this complex structure will be useful to corroborate the empirical results shown in later sections. 
                                                          
25 These groups are separated by the white lines in panel (b) of Figure 1.5. 
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1.4.2. Firm behavior and testable predictions 
Under Regimen Optativo, the basic firm’s problem can be written as, 
 max
𝑦, 𝑐?̂?𝑂𝐺𝑆, 𝑐?̂? 
 𝑦 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦) − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦) − 𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆, ?̂?𝑜) − ℎ(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦)). (16) 
In this setting, firms choose output, reported COGS and reported other costs to maximize their 
after-tax profits.  The cost of evasion function, ℎ(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦)), considers 
misreporting of both types of cost.26  Allowing the total cost function to be expressed as  𝑐(𝑦) =
𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦) + 𝑐𝑜(𝑦), yields optimal responses in line with those of the theoretical model.
27 
Overall, three groups of testable implications can be considered.  The first group relates to 
firms’ expected bunching at the kinks of the tax liability function. The second group results from 
the repercussions of the notch created by the exemption rule.  A third group arises from the 
differentiated incentives to misreport faced by firms selling physical goods versus those selling 
services.  All these sets of implications are discussed below. 
1.4.2.1. Bunching at the kinks of the tax liability function 
As shown in Figure 1.2, kinks in the tax liability function can lead to bunching when firms behave 
optimally. In the Guatemalan setting, there is two differentiated kink-induced responses expected 
from firms.  On the one hand, non-exempt firms face a kink at the MTS payment threshold (i.e. 
                                                          
26 As in the theoretical framework, this specification ignores turnover misreporting.  The model can be expanded to 
include this type of misreporting without altering its general conclusions. 
27 This total cost specification assumes that a given firm can only produce a level of output, 𝑦, with a unique 
combination of COGS and other costs.  While this assumption about the firm’s technology may be too restrictive in 
the long run, it seems plausible in the short run.  For the full derivation of the model’s optimality conditions in this 
setup, see the appendix to this chapter. 
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?̂? = 3%).  On the other, exempt firms face the kink at  ?̂? = 0.  Therefore, the two predictions 
arising from the existence of kinks in the tax liability function are the following: 
Prediction 1 - Non-exempt firms will have incentives to bunch at  ?̂? = 𝟑%.  As 
explained in the theoretical framework, non-exempt firms whose reported profit margin 
under a profit tax lies below 3% will respond to a minimum tax by decreasing both output 
and cost misreporting.28  This, in turn, increases the reported profit margin, causing 
bunching at the MTS payment threshold.   
Prediction 2 - Exempt firms will have incentives to bunch at  ?̂? = 𝟎%.  Contrary to the 
non-exempt group, exempt firms face a kink at  ?̂? = 0%.  This is a consequence of the 
impossibility to engage in loss carryforward.  Interestingly, from an analytical point of 
view this is equivalent to a minimum tax with a tax rate, 𝜏𝑦 = 0%, which implies that there 
is no real distortion as firms’ optimal output choice is guided by the condition  𝑐′(𝑦) =
1 − 𝜏𝑦 = 1.  In other words, any observed bunching by exempt firms at the specified 
threshold cannot be caused by an output response; instead, it would be generated by the 
evasion response, thus providing direct evidence of firms’ cost misreporting behavior.29 
1.4.2.2. Bunching at the MTS exemption threshold 
Figure 1.5 illustrates how the exemption rule of Regimen Optativo generates a firm-specific notch 
in the tax liability function.  This notch creates incentives for firms to misreport their gross margin, 
with the aim of becoming exemption-eligible and avoiding the minimum tax scheme.  However, 
                                                          
28 Conditional on being non-exempt, a firm’s reported COGS and other costs are equivalent for tax purposes.  Hence, 
there is no differentiated response in either, and a firm facing the minimum tax will reduce its cost misreporting in 
both margins. 
29 In a model that allows turnover misreporting, the difference in interpretation is that the evasion response is composed 
of both turnover and cost misreporting.  However, the no-real-response argument remains unaffected. 
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not all firms face the same misreporting incentives, as discussed earlier.  Besides their cost 
structure, firms’ incentives are also affected by their reported profit margin.30  For instance, a firm 
with a reported profit margin larger than 3% has no incentives to misreport  ?̂?, since their tax 
liability is the same whether it is exempt or non-exempt.  However, if its reported profit margin is 
lower than 3%, there are two scenarios in which it will have incentives to misreport its gross 
margin.  The first case is when the firm’s other costs are such that  4% ≥
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
> 1%  and their 
reported profit is positive; this corresponds to the middle quadrant in panel (b) of Figure 1.5.  The 
second case occurs if the firm reports losses and its cost structure is such that  
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
> 4%; a notch is 
also visible in the respective quadrant in panel (b) of Figure 1.5.  Table 1.3 summarizes firms’ 
incentives to misreport the gross margin according to their profitability and cost structure.   
 The heterogeneity of incentives to misreport the gross margin provides a valuable source 
of testable implications of the model.   The predictions derived from this framework are: 
Prediction 3 - Firms with incentives to misreport their gross margin will bunch at  
?̂? = 𝟒%.  As discussed above, firms located in quadrants where there is a notch will have 
incentives to misreport their gross margin.  These firms will tend to bunch below ?̂? = 4%  
in order to avoid payment of the minimum tax.   
Prediction 4 - Firms with no incentives to misreport their gross margin, will not bunch 
at this threshold at  ?̂? = 𝟒%.  In contrast to the previous group, firms located in quadrants 
where there is no notch face no incentives to misreport their gross margin.  Hence, this 
group serves as a placebo test, as firms should not bunch at ?̂? = 4%. 
                                                          
30 Profit margin groups are separated by the yellow lines in panel (b) of Figure 1.5. 
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1.4.2.3. Differentiated behavior of merchandise and services firms 
An additional implication of the minimum tax exemption rule is that firms selling physical goods 
–referred to as merchandise firms from here onwards– are more likely to engage in misreporting 
of the gross margin, in comparison to firms selling services.  This is because, in the Guatemalan 
context, the gross margin only takes into consideration the direct costs of producing physical 
goods, but it does not include the costs of producing services.31  Thus, it is expected that, on 
average, merchandise firms will have a lower gross margin than services firms.  This means that, 
for a given profit margin, merchandise firms are expected to be closer to the MTS exemption 
threshold than services firms.  This leads to the following prediction: 
Prediction 5 - Merchandise firms will show stronger bunching at  ?̂? = 𝟒%  than 
services firms. For any given profit margin, merchandise firms will have, on average, a 
smaller gross margin.  Hence, for merchandise firms with an initial gross margin above 
4%, the additional COGS misreporting needed to cross the MTS exemption threshold is 
smaller than that required by services firms.  Given the resulting difference in the marginal 
and total cost of misreporting, merchandise firms are expected to have a stronger response 
to the notch created by the MTS exemption, in comparison to services firms. 
Since it is expected that firms engage in cost misreporting, Prediction 5 cannot be tested 
directly.  This is because the actual values of COGS and other costs are not observable.  Therefore, 
the analysis uses an instrument to separate firms into those likely to have a high ratio of COGS 
(i.e. lower gross margin before misreporting) and those expected to have a low one.  The 
                                                          
31 For a more detailed explanation, see the description of the gross margin provided in earlier sections. 
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instrument used exploits the availability of detailed information on the sources of turnover, with 
firms categorized as either merchandise or services, as follows:   
• Merchandise firms - Firms reporting sales of physical goods equivalent to more than 80% 
of total turnover are considered in this category.32  Given their business focus, a large 
proportion of total costs coming from either production or inventory costs would be 
expected.  Hence, it is likely that these group of firms will run a high COGS ratio before 
misreporting occurs. 
• Services firms - Firms reporting sales coming from services provision amounting to more 
than 80% of turnover are selected in this category.  Due to the nature of their activities, a 
small proportion of physical goods production or inventory costs would be expected.  As a 
result, these firms are assumed to have a low COGS ratio before any misreporting takes 
place. 
 
1.4.3. Methodology for the estimation of bunching responses 
The existence of kinks and notches allows for the use of bunching techniques to identify firms’ 
responses (Saez, 2010; Chetty et al., 2011; Kleven and Waseem, 2013).  In the specific case of a 
minimum tax scheme, Best et al. (2015) show that firms’ responses can be decomposed into an 
output and an evasion component.  This paper uses their method to obtain estimates of those 
margins of response. 
Let us express the reported profit margin as, 
                                                          
32 This percentage is arbitrary.  However, robustness checks were carried out for both types of firms, with values 
ranging from 51% to 90%.  No significant changes in the results were observed. 
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 ?̂? =
𝑦−𝑐(𝑦)
𝑦
−
(𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦))
𝑦
, (17) 
where the first term in the right-hand side encapsulates the firm’s true profit margin, while the 
second term captures cost misreporting.33  When  ∆?̂?  is small the above decomposition can be 
used to totally differentiate  ?̂?  and obtain, 
∆?̂? =
𝜕?̂?
𝜕𝑦
𝑑𝑦 +
𝜕?̂?
𝜕(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
= (
?̂?
𝑦
− 𝑐′(𝑦))
𝑑𝑦
𝑦
−
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦
= ((1 − ?̂?) − 1)
𝑑𝑦
𝑦
−
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦
≈
𝜏𝑦
2
𝜏𝜋
𝜀𝑦 −
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦
 
The third row in the previous expression follows from the definition of the reported profit margin 
and the firm’s optimality condition for output.  The fourth row approximation arises from realizing 
that 
?̂? ≅
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
  in the vicinity of the MTS payment threshold, as well as from the definition of the elasticity 
of output with respect to the net-of-tax rate, 
𝜀𝑦 ≡
𝑑𝑦 𝑦⁄
𝑑(1 − 𝜏) (1 − 𝜏)⁄
 
where the fact that  
𝑑(1−𝜏)
(1−𝜏)
= −𝜏𝑦  when crossing the kink is also used.
34   
                                                          
33 As this decomposition will be used to obtain response estimates for non-exempt firms, there is no need to distinguish 
between COGS and other costs.   
34 The basic idea is that, to the right of the MTS payment threshold, the effective tax rate on output is zero because 
costs are fully deductible (i.e. there is no output distortion); however, to the left of the threshold, output is taxed at a 
rate  𝜏𝑦.  See Best et al. (2015) for further details. 
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The usefulness of the approximation above is that it allows us to separate the output and 
evasion responses.  The first term in the right-hand side captures the real response as a proportion 
of the elasticity of output.  The decomposition shows that this term will be relatively insensitive to 
the output elasticity, as  
𝜏𝑦
2
𝜏𝜋
  will be a very small value.35  The second term absorbs the evasion 
response, as a proportion of turnover.  This latter term can be converted to a ratio of reported profits 
as follows, 
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦
= (
𝑦 − ?̂?
𝑦
)
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦 − ?̂?
≈ (
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
)
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦 − ?̂?
 
In order to obtain empirical estimates using the previous decomposition, an estimate of the 
change in the reported profit margin is required.  This estimate can be calculated from the excess 
mass observed at the bunching point.  Following Saez (2010), when the bunching response, 𝐵, is 
local we can approximate the change in the reported profit margin as, 
𝐵 ≈ ∆?̂? 𝑓0 (
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
)   ⇔  ∆?̂? ≈
𝐵
𝑓0 (
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
)
 
where 𝑓0 (
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
) is the density of the profit margin around the MTS payment threshold in the absence 
of the minimum tax kink.   
The key aspect for this calculation to provide a good estimate of the bunching response is 
the choice of counterfactual density distribution.  The standard approach in the literature is to fit a 
polynomial using data from the empirical density distribution, leaving out the area visibly affected 
by the bunching response.  However, in the setting of this paper applying that procedure directly 
                                                          
35 In the case of the Guatemalan tax system, this value is equal to 0.000279. 
24 
 
 
would likely lead to a biased estimate of the bunching response.  This is because in the absence of 
a minimum tax, firms would be expected to bunch at  ?̂? = 0%, due to the no loss carryforward 
rule.  Since, under a minimum tax, non-exempt firms are not expected to bunch at that threshold, 
using the empirical density distribution of this group to estimate the counterfactual distribution 
would not be appropriate.  Instead, the approach followed here is to obtain the counterfactual 
distribution from the empirical density distribution of exempt firms, as this group represents the 
environment that would be faced by non-exempt firms in the absence of the minimum tax. 
1.5. Empirical Results  
This section shows the empirical evidence obtained using Guatemalan tax administrative data.  
First, evidence of bunching at the MTS payment threshold is analyzed. Second, evidence of gross 
margin misreporting is presented.  Finally, estimates of evasion obtained from the bunching 
responses are provided. 
1.5.1. Evidence of bunching at the kinks 
Prediction 1 states that non-exempt firms will have a tendency to bunch at the MTS payment 
threshold, while Prediction 2 indicates that exempt firms will have bunching incentives at  ?̂? =
0%.  The empirical evidence shown in Figure 1.6 strongly supports these theoretical predictions.  
Panel (a) presents the density distribution of the reported profit margin for exempt and non-exempt 
firms.  As seen in the figure, for the case of non-exempt firms there is clear evidence of bunching 
at  ?̂? = 3%.  In contrast, exempt firms show large bunching at  ?̂? = 0%, although there is also a 
smaller amount of bunching at the MTS threshold.  
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A possible explanation for the unexpected bunching of exempt firms at the MTS payment 
threshold is that there are fixed costs of obtaining the exemption.36  In other words, a firm may be 
exemption-eligible, but may decide not to claim this benefit if the costs of doing so exceed the tax 
gains received by the firm.  As explained earlier in the paper, firms claiming the MTS exemption 
face costs associated with submitting a series of legal and accounting documents well in advance 
of the filing deadline.  A firm that has not complied with these requirements is liable to pay the 
minimum tax, which means it faces the same incentives as non-exempt firms.  Unfortunately, the 
dataset does not include information on whether a given firm presented this documentation or not.  
However, one way to indirectly test this hypothesis is to analyze firms’ behavior by 
turnover groups.  If the costs of obtaining the exemption are fixed, firms with higher turnover 
should be less affected by them, as they represent a smaller proportion of their turnover.  Panel (b) 
of Figure 1.6 provides some empirical support for this hypothesis.  Exempt firms with a reported 
turnover below         8 million quetzales –low turnover firms– show sizeable bunching at the MTS 
payment threshold.37  In contrast, exempt firms with a reported turnover above 8 million quetzales 
–high turnover firms– appear to behave differentially, as they bunch significantly at  ?̂? = 0%, 
while having a negligible concentration at the MTS threshold.  As a comparison, non-exempt firms 
do not seem to alter their behavior, independently of their level of turnover. 
Further evidence in support of the fixed-cost hypothesis is provided in panels (c) and (d) 
of Figure 1.6.  In the first of these panels, the density distribution of the reported profit margin is 
shown for firms, according to their cost structure.  As indicated in Figure 1.5 and Table 1.3, firms 
                                                          
36 The literature on crime displacement has highlighted the importance of fixed costs when enforcement is selective. 
For instance, Yang (2008a) analyzes the role of fixed costs of switching to alternative duty-avoidance methods in the 
context of customs reform in the Philippines, finding evidence consistent with their existence. 
37 The exchange rate for the Guatemalan quetzal was roughly Q8 per US$1 for the period of analysis.  
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face different misreporting incentives depending on their ratio of other costs to turnover.  Firms 
with  
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
≤ 1% essentially face a pure profit tax and, hence, should not show any bunching at the 
MTS payment threshold in the absence of fixed costs.  However, the empirical density shows 
bunching at this threshold.  As in the case of panels (a) and (b), the density distributions presented 
in panel (d) illustrate that this bunching diminishes significantly for firms with a higher level of 
turnover.  Interestingly, firms with  1% <
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
≤ 4%  behave in a similar fashion as the previous 
group, suggesting that misreporting incentives are strong for this group.  Instead, firms with  
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
>
4%  do not show any differentiated behavior, a pattern consistent with the fixed-costs hypothesis.   
1.5.2. Evidence of gross margin misreporting 
As explained earlier in this paper, the income tax scheme under Regimen Optativo creates 
incentives for some firms to bunch below the gross margin exemption threshold, with the intention 
of avoiding the minimum tax.  Figure 1.7 shows evidence that firms behave according to what is 
predicted by the theoretical model.  Panel (a) displays the density distributions for firms with 
incentives to misreport the gross margin and those without these incentives.38  As expected from 
Predictions 3 and 4, the first group shows significant bunching at the MTS exemption threshold, 
while the latter group does not.  The two points of observed bunching for the group without 
incentives to misreport correspond to the kinks in the tax liability function, but not to the notch.39 
 Panel (b) of Figure 1.7 also provides strong evidence in favor of the theoretical predictions.  
First, it can be seen that firms reporting losses show large bunching at the MTS exemption 
                                                          
38 See Table 1.3 for the definition of which firms have incentives to misreport their gross margin and which do not. 
39 The reported profit margin can be expressed as  ?̂? = ?̂? −
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
.  Hence, for firms with a small value of  
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
, we get that  
?̂? ≈ ?̂?.  This means that the observed bunching at  ?̂? = 0%  and  ?̂? = 3%  in Figure 1.6 will be partially visible around  
?̂? = 0%  and  ?̂? = 3%, as seen for firms without incentives to misreport in panel (a) of Figure 1.7. 
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threshold.  This is important because these firms do not face a local kink in their tax liability 
function, indicating that their bunching behavior at that point can only be reconciled with gross 
margin misreporting.  Moreover, firms reporting a non-negative profit margin below 3% also 
bunch significantly at the MTS exemption threshold.  Once again, this is consistent with the theory, 
as this group faces strong incentives to misreport their gross margin.  Finally, firms with a reported 
profit margin above 3% provide a placebo test, as they should not bunch at the MTS exemption 
threshold.  This is because they do not face the minimum tax, given that their reported profit margin 
is above the MTS payment threshold.  Indeed, the figure shows that there is no observed bunching 
in this group. 
Additionally, panels (c) and (d) in Figure 1.7 offer graphical evidence of gross margin 
misreporting for merchandise and services firms.  Two features are significant in these graphs.  On 
the one hand, firms with misreporting incentives bunch at the MTS exemption threshold, while 
those without these incentives do not bunch.  This pattern, consistent with Predictions 3 and 4, 
occurs independently of whether the firms are merchandise or services firms.  On the other hand, 
the intensity of the bunching at the critical threshold is weaker for services firms, a feature 
consistent with Prediction 5.  In all, this pattern is suggestive of services firms facing, on average, 
higher costs of gross margin misreporting than merchandise firms. 
1.5.3. Bunching responses estimates 
The previous results provided evidence of firms’ bunching responses and their consistency with 
the theoretical framework.  This subsection builds on that behavior in order to calculate estimates 
of the bunching response, applying the methodology detailed in Section 4.  The analysis focuses 
on firms with a reported profit margin between 0% and 4%, for two reasons.  First, in this range 
there is a common support between exemption-eligible and non-exempt firms, allowing for 
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meaningful comparisons of the two groups.  Second, restricting the analysis to firms not reporting 
losses facilitates a better fit of the counterfactual distributions, which in turn results in better 
estimates of the bunching response at the minimum tax kink.   
Figure 1.8 displays the empirical density distribution of the profit margin for exemption-
eligible firms.  It also presents the estimated counterfactual density for this group.  Using these 
two distributions, the estimated excess bunching, 𝑏, caused by the fixed-costs of claiming the 
exemption is calculated at 5.66.40  Table 1.4 provides details of this estimation.  For instance, the 
implied average profit margin response at the MTS payment threshold consistent with this level 
of bunching is 0.57 percentage points.  If this response was only driven by a real adjustment (i.e. 
no evasion response), the estimated output elasticity would be 20.28, a value well above the typical 
range found in the literature.41  Instead, imposing more reasonable output elasticity values —from 
0 to 10— yields estimated evasion responses ranging from 9.56% to 18.36% of reported profits.   
 A more dramatic picture is given by non-exempt firms.  Figure 1.9 illustrates the empirical 
density distribution for this group and compares it to the estimated counterfactual distribution of 
exemption-eligible firms.  As argued earlier in this study, the latter distribution is the appropriate 
counterfactual for non-exempt firms, due to the existence of the no loss carryforward rule.  For 
this reason, in this context, the estimation procedure refrains from using the typical polynomial 
regression, which would fit data from non-exempt firms.42  In its place, the bunching response is 
                                                          
40 As in Best et al. (2015), the value of the excess bunching presented here is scaled by the average counterfactual 
density around the kink.  Formally, 𝑏 = ?̂?/𝐸(?̂?𝑗|𝑗 ∈ [𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝𝑈]), where ?̂?𝑗 represents the estimated counterfactual 
density at 𝑗, and [𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝𝑈] defines the excluded range. 
41 See, for example, Gruber and Rauh (2007), Devereux et al. (2014), and Patel et al (2017). 
42 For comparison purposes, the estimation results derived from fitting a flexible polynomial to the density distribution 
of non-exempt firms are shown in Table A.1 in the appendix to this chapter. 
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calculated by comparing the empirical density of non-exempt firms and the counterfactual 
distribution estimated with data from exemption-eligible firms. 
Given the above procedure, the estimate of  𝑏  is much larger than in the preceding case, at 
41.28.  The implied average profit margin response is 4.13 percentage points, more than seven 
times larger than the equivalent response for exemption-eligible firms.  In itself, the difference in 
estimated values for the profit margin response provides an interesting comparison of the impact 
that the minimum tax scheme has on firms’ reporting.  This difference is even more striking when 
contrasting estimates of the real and evasion responses.  Assuming no evasion, the estimated output 
elasticity for this group is a massive 147.96, a value that can be safely disregarded as unrealistic.  
When imposing reasonable output elasticities, the evasion response still shows disproportionate 
values, ranging from 128.30% to 137.60% of reported profits.   
The key to reconciling such large values with meaningful estimates of evasion is to note 
that this response, in terms of reported profits, can be linked to the firm’s response in terms of 
actual profits via, 
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦 − 𝑐
= (
𝑦 − ?̂?
𝑦 − 𝑐
)
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦 − ?̂?
. 
The ratio of reported-to-actual profits, (𝑦 − ?̂?)/(𝑦 − 𝑐), is unobserved.  However, in a tax system 
with no loss carryforward, it is possible to estimate an upper-bound for this ratio.  Since reported 
profits can be expressed as, (𝑦 − ?̂?) = (𝑦 − 𝑐) − (?̂? − 𝑐), then the ratio of reported-to-actual 
profits can be written as,  
(
𝑦 − ?̂?
𝑦 − 𝑐
) = 1 − (
?̂? − 𝑐
𝑦 − ?̂?
) (
𝑦 − ?̂?
𝑦 − 𝑐
). 
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Solving for the variable of interest yields, 
(
𝑦 − ?̂?
𝑦 − 𝑐
) =
1
1 + (
?̂? − 𝑐
𝑦 − ?̂?)
. 
While the ratio of reported costs to reported profits is also unobserved, in the absence of 
loss carryforward the model predicts that the absolute value of the evasion response cannot be 
larger than total misreporting.  This is because there is no benefit of reporting losses if they cannot 
be carried forward to the next fiscal year.  Using this fact, we can obtain an upper-bound for the 
ratio of reported-to-actual profits as follows, 
(
𝑦 − ?̂?
𝑦 − 𝑐
) ≤
1
1 + |
𝑑(?̂? − 𝑐)
𝑦 − ?̂? |
. 
The above formula is very useful, as it allows us to obtain an estimate of the minimum level of 
evasion (as a proportion of actual profits), directly from the estimated evasion response.  In the 
context of a minimum tax scheme, this estimate should be interpreted as the ratio of reported-to-
actual profits that would be observed in the absence of the minimum tax.  
Table 1.4 summarizes the estimates of the evasion response and the ratio of reported-to-
actual profits for the Guatemalan case.  As it can be seen, the data suggests that evasion is a big 
concern, with estimates of the average ratio of reported-to-actual profits ranging between 0.42 to 
0.91.  Such magnitudes are indicative of an environment where tax enforcement is weak, creating 
strong incentives for firms’ misreporting.   
While the implied levels of evasion derived from these estimates seem high when 
compared with expected levels of evasion in developed economies, these numbers are not entirely 
surprising for developing countries.  For instance, Bachas and Soto (2017) estimate that evasion 
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could be as large as 70% of actual firm profits in the case of Costa Rica.  Similarly, Pecho et al. 
(2012) present estimates for income tax non-compliance in several Latin American countries 
during the period 2000-2010; their estimates range from 34.5% in Colombia to 72% in Guatemala. 
1.6. Conclusions 
This paper studies firm responses under a minimum tax in the context of a developing country.  
The study of such behavior is important for societies in the developing world for two reasons.  
First, many of these countries collect lower tax revenues than advanced economies, despite similar 
statutory rates. Second, in environments with weak enforcement, governments are inclined to use 
production-inefficient taxation, such as minimum tax schemes, in order to increase revenues. 
Recent work by Best et al (2015), suggests that these policies can improve social welfare through 
their effect on the government’s revenue efficiency.   
Besides the behavioral consequences of the kink created by minimum taxes in the tax 
liability function, the present study also analyses the implications of exemption rules in this 
framework.  As shown in the paper, the revenue effectiveness of minimum tax schemes is 
negatively affected by the existence of exemption rules allowing firms to avoid the minimum tax.  
Depending on their specification, these exemption rules can create firm-specific upward or 
downward notches in the tax liability function faced by firms.  The resulting incentives on firms’ 
reporting behavior run contrary to the government’s objective of increasing tax collection.   
The empirical evidence from Guatemalan corporate income tax returns provides strong 
support to the paper’s theoretical predictions.  As expected, firms facing the upward notch created 
by Regimen Optativo’s exemption rule respond by significantly bunching below the exemption 
threshold.  Interestingly, this behavior is also salient in firms reporting negative profits, despite the 
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fact that it implies an overstatement of their losses.  Additionally, the analysis finds differentiated 
responses for merchandise and services firms, with the former group showing stronger bunching 
behavior.  This is consistent with the fact that, on average, merchandise firms face lower marginal 
costs of crossing the exemption threshold than services firms. 
The empirical results also suggest that the Guatemalan minimum tax scheme contributes 
considerably to the reduction of tax evasion among firms that cannot avoid this scheme.  Non-
exempt firms bunch significantly at the minimum tax kink, a behavior consistent with a reduction 
in firms’ misreporting.  Estimates of the evasion response in this group suggest a reduction in 
misreporting of as much as 137% of reported profits.  Using this estimate, the paper exploits the 
no loss carryforward rule of Regimen Optativo to calculate an upper bound for the ratio of reported-
to-actual profits.  According to these computations, firms report, on average, no more than 42% of 
their true profits in the absence of the minimum tax scheme.  This number implies that evasion 
arising from profit misreporting would be at least 58% of actual profits if this scheme was not in 
place.  Hence, the results provide empirical support to the view that minimum taxes can be an 
effective mechanism to lower tax evasion in environments with limited enforcement capabilities.  
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1.8. Figures and Tables 
 
 
Figure 1.1 – Income tax liability function under a minimum tax scheme.  The figure illustrates the implications of 
introducing a minimum tax on the income tax liability function, expressed as a proportion of turnover, 𝑦.  The dashed 
line shows what the tax liability would have been under a pure profits tax (assuming no loss carryforward); the solid 
line corresponds to the tax liability under the minimum tax scheme.  Firms with a reported profit margin, ?̂? ≡
𝑦−𝑐̂
𝑦
, 
above the threshold  
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
  face a tax rate 𝜏𝜋 on reported profits.  Instead, firms with a reported profit margin below 
the threshold pay a tax rate  𝜏𝑦  on turnover.  As a result, the conditions that characterize firm behavior change 
depending on which side of the threshold the firm is located. 
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Figure 1.2 – Firm behavior and bunching when switching from a profit tax to a minimum tax scheme.  Point A 
depicts a firm facing a profit tax, with an initial reported profit margin below the MTS payment threshold.  When a 
minimum tax scheme is introduced, the firm suddenly finds itself at point B, where the initial reported profit margin 
does not reflect the firm’s optimal choices any longer. Under the new tax incentives, the firm responds by reducing 
both its output and misreported cost. The firm’s new optimal choice is illustrated by point C, where the reported 
profit margin moves closer to the MTS payment threshold, causing bunching in the density distribution. 
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Figure 1.3 – Implications of exemption rules that create an upward notch.  In the above graphs, firms’ exemption 
from a minimum tax scheme is dictated by the parameter 𝜑.  To the left of 𝜑  firms are exempt and, hence, the tax 
function corresponds to that of a pure profit tax.  Instead, to the right of 𝜑 firms are non-exempt, resulting in a tax 
function akin to that of Figure 1.  Panel (a) illustrates the case where 𝜑 effectively eliminates the MTS, while  
panel (b) shows the case where it creates an upward notch at the MTS exemption threshold.  In contrast to the 
environment in Figure 2, a firm in panel (b) can now choose to move from points A to C, or from points A to C’.  
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Figure 1.4 – Implications of exemption rules that create a downward notch.  Firms’ exemption from the minimum 
tax scheme is defined by the parameter 𝜑.  Firms with a reported profit margin below 𝜑  are non-exempt and, thus, 
face a tax function identical to that of Figure 1.  Instead, firms to the right of 𝜑 are exempt, facing a tax function that 
corresponds to a pure profit tax.  Panel (a) illustrates the case where 𝜑 has no impact on the MTS tax liability 
function; firms in this setting behave as in Figure 2, moving from points A to C.  Panel (b) shows the case where a 
downward notch is created; firms respond to the new tax incentives by moving from points A to C’. 
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Figure 1.5 – Implications of the exemption rule for the Guatemalan minimum tax scheme.  Panel (a) displays the 
minimum tax scheme, ignoring the implications of the exemption rule.  Non-exempt firms face a kink in the tax 
function at  ?̂? = 3%.  When accounting for the exemption rule, the tax function also features a notch whose location 
varies depending on the firm-specific MTS exemption threshold.  Panel (b) shows that this location is related to the 
firm’s reported “other” costs (i.e. the difference between the firm’s total costs and COGS). 
Panel (a) – Minimum Tax Scheme for non-exempt firms under Regimen Optativo 
Panel (b) – Minimum Tax Scheme and Exemption Rule under Regimen Optativo 
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Figure 1.6 – Kernel density distributions of reported profit margin. – Panels (a) and (b) – Panel (a) shows the kernel 
density distribution of reported profit margin for exempt and non-exempt firms. As expected, exempt firms bunch 
at  ?̂? = 0%, while non-exempt firms do so at  ?̂? = 3%. Panel (b) displays the corresponding distributions for low-
turnover and high-turnover firms. Low-turnover firms are those reporting less than Q8 million turnover annually –
about US$1 million–, and high-turnover firms include those reporting more than this amount. The evidence is 
consistent with the existence of fix costs for claiming the exemption, as the behavior of high turnover exempt firms 
is substantially different than that of low turnover exempt firms. The bin size used in the kernel densities is 0.25. 
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Figure 1.6 – Kernel density distributions of reported profit margin. – Panels (c) and (d) –  Panel (c) presents the 
kernel density distribution of reported profit margin for firms according to their cost structure.  As expected, firms 
with  
𝑐?̂?
𝑦
> 4%  bunch at the MTS payment threshold, while firms with lower other costs ratio have a stronger 
tendency to bunch at  ?̂? = 0%.  Panel (d) shows the respective distributions for low-turnover and high-turnover 
firms.  As in panel (b), the graphic evidence is consistent with the existence of fixed costs of claiming the exemption.  
The bin size used in the kernel densities is 0.25. 
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Figure 1.7 – Kernel density distributions of reported gross margin. – Panels (a) and (b) – Panel (a) shows the density 
distribution of the reported gross margin for firms with and without misreporting incentives.  For those with 
misreporting incentives, bunching occurs at the MTS exemption threshold.  In contrast, firms with no misreporting 
incentives, do not show bunching at the same threshold.  Panel (b) presents the density distribution for firms with 
different profit margin ranges.  Firms with a reported profit margin below 3% show significant bunching, but those 
with a larger profit margin do not.  This behavior is consistent with differentiated misreporting incentives. 
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Figure 1.7 – Kernel density distributions of reported gross margin. – Panels (c) and (d) – Panel (c) illustrates the 
density distribution of the reported gross margin for merchandise firms with and without misreporting incentives.  
As expected, significant bunching occurs at the MTS exemption threshold for the group with misreporting incentives 
only.  Panel (d) displays a similar pattern for services firms.   Moreover, it shows that the intensity of the bunching is 
weaker for services firms in comparison to merchandise firms, as predicted by the theory.  The bin size used in the 
graphs is 0.2. 
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Figure 1.8 – Bunching Estimation for Exemption-eligible Firms at the MTS payment threshold.  The figure illustrates 
the empirical density of the profit margin (in % of turnover) and the estimated counterfactual density for exemption-
eligible firms.  The counterfactual density is estimated from the empirical density, using a fifth-order polynomial, 
excluding data around the threshold where bunching is visible, and imposing that the excess area created by this 
bunching be equal to the missing area in the affected region to the left of the threshold.  The excluded area is 
delimited by the two dashed vertical lines.  A bin size of 0.1 is used to plot the graph.  Since firms in this group are 
eligible to claim the minimum tax payment exemption, the bunching at the MTS threshold arises from the existence 
of fixed costs and other frictions that prevent firms from claiming this exemption. 
 
Figure 1.9 – Bunching Estimation for Non-exempt Firms at the MTS payment threshold.  The figure above illustrates 
the empirical density of the profit margin (in % of turnover) for non-exempt firms, using a bin size of 0.1.  The 
counterfactual density shown corresponds to that estimated from the empirical density of exempt firms as in Figure 
1.  This counterfactual density captures the fact that non-exempt firms would face similar incentives to exemption-
eligible firms if they were not subject to pay the minimum tax.  The estimated excess mass in this figure comes from 
the difference between the depicted densities in the range enclosed by the dashed vertical lines. 
  
b = 41.28 
b = 5.66 
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Table 1.1 – Corporate Income Tax Rates and Tax Bases under Regimen Optativo 
 Firms reporting losses Firms reporting profits 
 0% > ?̂? 3% > ?̂? ≥ 0% ?̂? ≥ 3% 
Non-exempt 
?̂? > 4% 
0.93% of reported 
turnover and no loss 
carryforward 
0.93% of reported 
turnover 
31% of reported  
profits 
Exempt 
4% ≥ ?̂? 
0% of reported  
profits and no loss 
carryforward 
31% of reported  
profits 
31% of reported  
profits 
Notes:  ?̂?  denotes a firm’s reported profit margin;  ?̂?  indicates a firm’s reported gross margin. 
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Table 1.2 – Summary Statistics for Firms under Regimen Optativo 
Indicator 
Full 
Sample 
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
 A. Means (in millions of Quetzales) 
Profits 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3 
Turnover 10.1 8.3 10.0 9.8 9.7 9.9 10.9 11.6 
Total Costs 9.7 7.9 9.6 9.5 9.5 9.6 10.6 11.3 
COGS 6.0 4.8 6.2 5.9 5.7 5.8 6.4 6.8 
Profit Margin -1.2% -0.1% -0.5% -1.4% -1.7% -1.8% -1.3% -1.5% 
Gross Margin 59.4% 60.5% 59.8% 59.5% 59.2% 58.7% 58.9% 59.0% 
 B. Other Characteristics 
Share of 
exemption-
eligible firms 
9.4% 8.5% 9.0% 9.4% 9.6% 10.2% 9.8% 9.4% 
Share of  
returns filed 
electronically 
44.9% 26.9% 37.3% 40.1% 45.1% 49.2% 53.4% 59.0% 
Observations 133,122 17,222 18,404 18,606 19,068 19,767 20,103 19,952 
Notes:  The statistics above are calculated including only the sample of firms under analysis. “COGS” refers to the 
direct cost of goods sold. 
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Table 1.3 – Incentives to misreport the gross margin by firms’ cost structure and profitability 
 Firms reporting losses Firms reporting profits 
 0% > ?̂? 3% > ?̂? ≥ 0% ?̂? ≥ 3% 
1% ≥
?̂?𝑜
𝑦
 No incentives No incentives No incentives 
4% ≥
?̂?𝑜
𝑦
> 1% No incentives Incentives to misreport No incentives 
?̂?𝑜
𝑦
> 4% Incentives to misreport No incentives No incentives 
Notes:  ?̂?  denotes a firm’s reported profit margin;  ?̂?𝑜 indicates reported other costs, defined as the difference 
between total reported cost and reported COGS;  𝑦  represents the firm’s turnover. 
 
Table 1.4 – Estimated evasion responses at the MTS payment threshold 
 
Observed responses 
Model 
without 
Evasion  
Model with Evasion 
(values show change in misreporting  
in % of reported profits) 
 
Bunching 
(𝑏) 
Profit 
Margin 
Response 
(∆?̂?) 
Estimated 
Output 
Elasticity 
(𝜀𝑦) 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 0 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 0.5 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 1 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 5 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 10 
Exemption-eligible 
Firms 
5.66 0.57 20.28 18.86 18.39 17.93 14.21 9.56 
Ratio of reported-
to-actual profits 
(upper-bound) 
   0.84 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.91 
Non-Exempt Firms 41.28 4.13 147.96 137.60 137.14 136.67 132.95 128.30 
Ratio of reported-
to-actual profits 
(upper-bound) 
   0.42 0.42 0.42 0.43 0.44 
Note: Evasion response estimates of more than 100 imply that the estimated cost misreporting is larger than reported profits.  
These values can be reconciled theoretically, insofar as reported profits are expected to be lower than actual profits in the 
presence of evasion.  The reported estimates for the upper-bound of the ratio of reported-to-actual profits, (𝑦 − ?̂?)/(𝑦 − 𝑐), are 
calculated as described in Section 5.3.  
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CHAPTER 2 
Estimating the fiscal impact of extreme weather events 
 
2.1. Introduction 
Since 2000, the number of reported natural disasters around the world has ranged between 300 and 
450 per year (Laframboise and Acevedo, 2014).  Natural disasters can cause tremendous losses of 
human life and substantial economic damages.  For instance, the death toll of the 2010 earthquake 
in Haiti was estimated around 160,000, while the economic damages from Hurricane Mitch in 
Honduras in 1998 were calculated at 38% of GDP. 
From a fiscal perspective, natural disasters can also have negative effects as they tend to 
decrease government revenue and increase public expenditure.1  In a recent study on the fiscal 
impacts of hurricanes in the US, Deryugina (2016) finds that the present value of transfers over a 
ten-year period increases by as much as $780-$1,150 per capita as a result of such an event, and 
estimates the direct aid relief expenses to average $155-$160 per capita.2  To the extent that the 
resulting imbalance is financed with debt or by substituting planned public investment, these 
dynamics put pressure on the long-term sustainability of governments’ finances.   
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion regarding the fiscal impact of natural disasters, see Chapter 3 of Benson and Clay (2004). 
2 These figures are expressed in 2013 dollars.  As a point of comparison, the US federal expenditures per capita for 
2013 are estimated at $10,910. 
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Surprisingly, despite its apparent importance for fiscal policy, relatively little is known 
about the magnitude of the fiscal response in the wake of a disaster. A large portion of the literature 
in the subject focuses on case studies, instead of a more systematic approach.  However, there has 
been a renewed interest in the subject in recent years.  Partly, the reason behind this change is that 
some studies have linked climate change with an increase in the frequency and intensity of extreme 
weather events.3 
This paper is guided by two questions that arise in this context.  The first one is to quantify 
the average impact of extreme weather events on the budget balance.  While this in itself is not a 
novel question, the relative lack of research on this issue makes it an area still open for debate.  
The present analysis attempts to answer this question by using data on extreme weather events.   
The focus on this type of weather events is convenient from an analytical point of view, because 
of their exogeneity with respect to a country’s fiscal policy goals, as well as the wide availability 
of statistical databases with information about their occurrence.   
Provided that there is a significant impact, the second question pursued in this study focuses 
on what the main channels of transmission are.  For instance, is the deterioration of the budget 
balance mainly a result of lower government revenues or higher public expenditure?  From a policy 
perspective, it would be useful to have some guidance on this aspect.  To the author’s knowledge, 
there are no systematic studies in the literature that attempt to analyze this issue simultaneously. 
The paper will proceed as follows.  Section 2 provides a summary of the literature on 
natural disasters and its link to public finance.  The theoretical framework on which the analysis 
                                                          
3 Although the link between climate change and a higher frequency of extreme weather events is still under debate, 
recent studies suggest its existence.  For a broader view of this literature, see Mann et al. (2017), as well as Huber and 
Gulledge (2011).  Furthermore, IPCC (2012) provides a comprehensive review of the risks that such a relationship 
would imply. 
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is based is developed in Section 3.  The description of the database and other methodological 
aspects are presented in Section 4.  The empirical results are discussed in Section 4.  Finally, the 
conclusions of the study are summarized in Section 5.  
2.2. Literature review 
Given the potential importance of natural disasters for fiscal policy, it is surprising that the number 
of studies that systematically analyze their impact on the public finances is relatively limited.  Most 
of the current literature on natural disasters centers on broader macroeconomic outcomes, while a 
second group analyzes the benefits of insuring against such events.4     
Among the studies that include the fiscal dimension, a large fraction relies on country 
cases.  For instance, Benson and Clay (2004) look at data from Bangladesh, Dominica and Malawi, 
concluding that budget reallocation is a frequently used tool in the aftermath of a natural disaster.  
Moreover, Heipertz and Nickel (2008) use a sample of natural disasters that occurred in the US 
and the European Union, estimating a fiscal impact between 0.3% and 1.1% of GDP.  Deryugina 
(2016) shows that, in the US, direct disaster-related public expenditure accounts for a relatively 
small proportion of the fiscal response.  Instead, a more significant proportion corresponds to 
transfers, such as unemployment insurance and public medical payments.  Besides 
More recent studies attempt to carry out more systematic approaches to the problem.  Lis 
and Nickel (2010) use a fixed-effects model with data from 138 countries, estimating an increase 
in the fiscal deficit of about 1.1% of GDP after the occurrence of an extreme weather event.  
However, their study neglects any lagged effects.  Melecky and Raddatz (2011) use a vector 
                                                          
4 For a review of the literature that studies the macroeconomic effects of natural disasters, see Cavallo and Noy (2010).  
Yang (2008) also provides an interesting discussion on these issues, focusing on the response of international financial 
flows.  Additionally, see Borensztein et al (2008) for a perspective on the benefits of insurance against the risk of 
disasters. 
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autoregressive model (VAR), also estimating a negative effect on the budget balance, which they 
observe to be more widespread in lower-middle-income countries.  Noy and Nualsri (2011) use a 
VAR model and find that, following large natural catastrophes, fiscal behavior is counter-cyclical 
in developed economies, but pro-cyclical in developing countries.  Ouattara and Strobl (2013) 
analyze data from Caribbean countries, concluding that public expenditure rises after a natural 
disaster.  Their study also estimates a lagged effect that persists up to two years after the shock.  
Finally, using Russian data, Leppänen et al. (2015) identify a negative non-linear relation between 
regional budget expenditures as a result of temperature increases.    
The present study contributes to this literature in three dimensions.  First, based on 
theoretical foundations, it expands the fixed-effects framework used by Lis and Nickel (2010) to 
include the possibility of lagged impacts of extreme weather events.  Second, in addition to 
estimating the incidence of these weather events on the budget balance, it also analyzes their 
impact on government revenues and public expenditure, separately.  Lastly, it uses a larger dataset 
than previous studies, covering 168 countries for the years from 2000 to 2015.  The advantage of 
focusing on this period is the wider availability of macroeconomic and disaster data, which allows 
for a larger number of observations while keeping the panel dataset relatively balanced. 
2.3. Theoretical Framework 
2.3.1 Basic Model 
The model that provides the foundation for the empirical analysis of this paper has its roots on the 
government’s budget balance identity.  Let  𝐵𝑡,  𝑇𝑡  and  𝐺𝑡  represent the budget balance, fiscal 
revenue and public expenditure at time t, respectively.  The budget balance identity is: 
 𝐵𝑡 ≡ 𝑇𝑡 − 𝐺𝑡. (1) 
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The above equation can be expanded by expressing the right-hand side in terms of fiscal, 
macroeconomic and other variables, as follows, 
 𝐵𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡𝑓(𝑌𝑡, 𝑋𝑡) − [𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝐺
𝑝(𝑌𝑡, 𝑋𝑡) + ∑ 𝐸𝑡,𝑡−𝑠
𝑛
𝑠=0 ] (2) 
where,  
𝜏𝑡 : average tax rate in period t, 
𝑓(𝑌𝑡, 𝑋𝑡) :  tax base as a function of GDP (𝑌𝑡) and a vector of other characteristics (𝑋𝑡), 
𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑡−1 :  interest payments on past debt (𝐷𝑡−1), with an average interest rate  𝑟𝑡, 
𝐺𝑝(𝑌𝑡, 𝑋𝑡) :  primary “regular” expenditures (i.e. not disaster-related) as a function of 
GDP and other characteristics, 
𝐸𝑡,  𝑡−𝑠 :  disaster-related expenditure in period t  from an extreme weather event with 
occurrence in period  t – s. 
The first term on the right-hand side of equation (2) captures the fiscal revenue obtained by the 
government.  Although not explicitly stated, this term is also indirectly determined by disasters, 
insofar as GDP is affected by their occurrence.  The second term, enclosed by brackets, contains 
the typical components of government expenditure –debt interest payments and primary 
expenditure–, plus a final component that incorporates disaster-related expenditure.  In this 
context, it is useful to think of the latter expenditure item as those expenses needed for the 
emergency response and reconstruction post-disaster.  Finally, the vector of other characteristics, 
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𝑋𝑡, represents variables such as inflation, interest rate, election cycles, etc. which can affect the 
levels of fiscal revenue and public expenditure at a given period.5 
A helpful transformation of equation (2), for empirical purposes, is to express it in 
percentage of GDP, and then take a first difference.  This yields, 
 ∆𝑏𝑡 = 𝜏 ∆ (
𝑓(𝑌𝑡,𝑋𝑡)
𝑌𝑡
) − 𝑟∆𝑑𝑡−1 − ∆𝑔𝑡
𝑝 − (∑ 𝑒𝑡,𝑡−𝑠
𝑛
𝑠=0 − ∑ 𝑒𝑡−1,𝑡−1−𝑢
𝑛
𝑢=0 ) (3) 
where, for simplicity,  𝜏  and  𝑟  are assumed to be constant over time, and lowercase letters indicate 
ratios to GDP.  In words, equation (3) relates the change in the budget balance to changes in the 
tax base, public debt, primary expenditure, as well as current and lagged disaster-related expenses, 
all expressed as ratios to GDP. 
2.3.2 Understanding the impact of disaster shocks in the budget balance 
In order to complement the basic insights given by the relationship in equation (3), an 
understanding of the channels through which extreme weather events may affect the components 
of the budget balance is important.  In what follows, the main avenues through which this impact 
takes place are discussed.6 
On the one hand, the occurrence of a disaster is expected to negatively affect government 
revenues, on impact.  This contemporary effect is a consequence of the adverse shock to GDP, 
which in turn automatically reduces the tax base.  However, there may also be lagged effects on 
fiscal revenues, depending on the dynamics of GDP in the post-disaster period.  For instance, there 
could be a positive lagged impact arising from the stimulus created by reconstruction activities, 
                                                          
5 See Woo (2003), Tujula and Wolswijk (2004), and Zeng (2014) for a list of other budget balance determinants. 
6 This is not intended to be an exhaustive account.  For a more detailed discussion, see Chapter 3 in Benson and Clay 
(2004). 
56 
 
 
which typically extend for more than one period.  Moreover, there could also be a negative lagged 
impact if the economy is unable to bounce back quickly from the initial shock to GDP, a situation 
that can potentially lead to lower-than-planned investment.  A further channel to be considered is 
financial aid.  As shown by Yang (2008), official development assistance flows –a fraction of 
which enters the government’s budget– tend to increase as a result of disaster occurrence, but this 
response seems to come with a lag of about two years.  All in all, a weather event shock is expected 
to lower government revenues on impact, with an ambiguous effect on the post-disaster period. 
On the other hand, disasters are also likely to provoke additional public expenditure, both 
through emergency and reconstruction expenses.  The former category takes place in the 
immediate aftermath of the disaster, while the latter is expected to start with some lag, as it 
typically involves the repair and rehabilitation of public infrastructure.  This potential increase in 
government expenditure may be attenuated by the reallocation of financial resources previously 
committed in the budget, with such a margin of response likely to be intensified in the presence of 
credit constraints. 
Therefore, the general conclusion is that the overall effect of a disaster on the budget 
balance is expected to be negative on impact, but its lagged consequences remain ambiguous. 
2.4. Data and Empirical Methodology 
2.4.1 Data 
The database built for this analysis merges information from three different sources, 
including a total of 168 countries for the period from 2000 to 2015.7  As indicated before, the 
advantage of focusing on these years is the wider availability of macroeconomic and disaster data, 
                                                          
7 The list of countries included is shown in Table B.1, in the appendix to this chapter. 
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which allows for a larger number of observations while keeping the panel dataset relatively 
balanced. 
Detailed data on the occurrence of weather events comes from EM-DAT database.  The 
information includes the number of deaths caused by each event, how many people were affected, 
as well as the estimated economic damage.   
Macroeconomic and fiscal data comes from the World Economic Ouput (WEO) database, 
published by the International Monetary Fund.  Among other variables, it contains information on 
a country’s gross domestic product (GDP), real growth rate, and inflation rate, as well as its 
government’s budget balance, total revenues, total expenditures, and public debt.   
Finally, data on electoral years comes from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI), 
elaborated by the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB).  This dataset includes both 
presidential as well as legislative election years.  
2.4.2 Definition of extreme weather events 
The EM-DAT database provides information on natural disasters, but it does not categorize the 
events based on their level of social or economic damage.  In order to define what an extreme 
weather event is, three criteria were used for selection:8 
Criterion 1:  100,000 or more affected people, 
Criterion 2:  1,000 or more deaths, 
Criterion 3:  At least 2% of GDP in estimated economic damages. 
                                                          
8 Other studies have used similar criteria.  See, for instance, Lis and Nickel (2010). 
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For the purposes of this paper, if a weather event fulfills at least one of these three criteria, then it 
is classified as an extreme weather event.   
Furthermore, it is important to mention that only the following categories of natural 
disasters were considered:  landslides, storms (hurricanes, cyclones, typhoons, and tropical 
storms), droughts and floods.  These categories were selected because of their high frequency and 
global incidence, as well as their potential relationship with climate change. 
2.4.3 Benchmark econometric model 
The empirical estimation relies on a fixed-effects model for panel data.  Its basic formulation is 
based on the theoretical specification shown in equation (3), adapted to fit the availability of data.  
The model is, 
 ∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1∆𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝜋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑠+1𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑠
𝑛
𝑠=0  
 +𝜇𝑖 + 𝜆𝑡 + 𝜈 𝑖𝑡  (4) 
where, 
∆𝑏𝑖𝑡 :  change in the budget deficit, as a percentage of GDP, for country  𝑖  in 
period 𝑡,  
∆𝑑𝑖,𝑡−1 :  change in the (lagged) debt-to-GDP ratio,  
𝑟𝑔𝑑𝑝𝑔𝑖𝑡 :  real GDP growth rate,  
𝜋𝑖𝑡 :  inflation rate, measured by the percentage change in Consumer Price 
Index,  
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 :  election dummy variable, with 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 1  in the event of either 
presidential or legislative elections, and  𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 0  otherwise. 
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𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 :  disaster dummy variable, for country  𝑖  in period (𝑡 − 𝑠), with  
𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 = 1  if at least one extreme weather event took place, 
and  𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 = 0  otherwise. 
𝜇𝑖 :  country fixed effects 
𝜆𝑡 :  time fixed effects 
𝜈 𝑖𝑡 :  random error 
The adapted model is purposely similar to the one used by Lis and Nickel (2010), with the 
objective of allowing for comparisons.  The inclusion of lags of the disaster dummy reflects the 
possibility of multi-period effects, as discussed in previous sections.   
 In the empirical exercise, fixed-effects models were also estimated using the change in 
government revenues, ∆𝑟𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑡, and the change in public expenditure, ∆𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡, as dependent 
variables.  The aim of this exercise is to gain some knowledge regarding the relative impact of the 
disaster shock on each component of the budget balance.   
2.5. Empirical Results 
This section presents the empirical results obtained from estimating the benchmark model, as well 
as alternative models.  In order to ensure comparability with other studies, each set of estimations 
was carried out twice.  The first time the model is run without lags in the disaster variable, while 
the second these lags are added. 
2.5.1 Benchmark model estimation 
Table 2.1 shows the results of the fixed-effect model.  Columns (1) and (2) correspond to the 
estimates of the model without and with lags, respectively, using the change in the budget balance 
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as a dependent variable.  As it can be observed, both sets of estimates provide similar results.  
According to the model without lags, the occurrence of at least one extreme weather event 
decreases the budget balance by 0.49% of GDP.  This estimate is similar when allowing for lagged 
effects, as the coefficient on contemporary disaster occurrence implies a negative impact of 0.46% 
of GDP.  Interestingly, the results also show an additional and significant effect two periods after 
the disaster took place.9  The magnitude of this lagged effect is sizeable, at -0.56% of GDP.  While 
the model does not allow us to distinguish the precise mechanism behind this latter impact, a 
hypothesis consistent with these results would be the completion of reconstruction work for public 
infrastructure.  
 The results using government revenues as a dependent variable are presented in columns 
(3) and (4) of Table 2.1.10  In the model without lags, an extreme weather event is estimated to 
negatively affect government revenues by 0.58% of GDP.  The model with lags provides a similar 
contemporary estimate, calculating the negative impact at 0.55% of GDP.  There is no suggestion 
of statistically significant lagged effects on government revenues.  
Finally, columns (5) and (6) display the estimates of the model that uses public expenditure 
as a dependent variable.  Both the models without and with lags do not find any statistically 
significant effect of the contemporary disaster variable on public expenditure.  Instead, the model 
with lags finds a significant impact two periods after the event.  The magnitude of this effect 
suggests an increase of about 0.40% of GDP in public expenditure.  As commented above, this 
                                                          
9 The results presented in this paper only consider a model with two lags of the disaster variable.  However, the results 
of models with further lags –not shown, but available from the author upon request– are largely consistent with the 
estimates displayed in Table 2.1.  Moreover, in the majority of alternative specifications, estimates of the lagged 
disaster dummy greater than two periods after the event are not statistically significant. 
10 All models using government revenues as a dependent variable omit the debt-to-GDP ratio as a control variable.  
This is because there is no theoretical foundation that justifies a relationship between these two variables. 
61 
 
 
lagged impact is consistent with a hypothesis that considers the completion of reconstructed 
infrastructure but cannot be verified with the current data. 
2.5.2 Results by per capita income classification 
The results for the full sample, presented in Table 2.1, do not take into account the possibility that 
economic development may play a role in how large the fiscal impact of extreme weather events 
is.  In order to consider this, the benchmark model was estimated separating the countries into four 
different groups.  These categories classify countries according to their income per capita.11  A 
priori, developed economies are expected to be better prepared to face natural disasters than 
developing countries.  Thus, the fiscal impact should be higher in the latter group. 
 Panel A of Table 2.2 presents the results for the change in the budget balance.  Columns 
(1) and (2) focus on the estimates for high-income countries; columns (3) and (4) include the results 
for upper-middle income countries; columns (5) and (6) display the estimation for lower-middle 
income countries; and, lastly, columns (7) and (8) contain the results for low-income countries.  
As shown in the table, the negative fiscal impact of extreme weather events concentrates on the 
two categories with the lowest income per capita.  For these groups, the model without lags 
estimates the contemporary deterioration of the budget balance as a result of the disaster shock at 
0.76% and 0.90% of GDP, respectively.  Similarly, the model with lags also shows a statistically 
significant negative effect on impact of 0.75% of GDP for lower-middle income countries, and of 
0.77% of GDP for the low-income group.  On the contrary, the model does not show any significant 
effects for high-income and upper-middle income countries.  Furthermore, the coefficients of the 
                                                          
11 The categories used correspond to the World Bank’s income classification for 2016.  According to this scale, 
countries are considered to be low-income if their per capita GDP is below US$1,006; lower-middle income if it 
ranges between US$1,006 and US$3,955; upper-middle income if above US$3,955 and below US$12,235; and high 
income if it exceeds US$12,235. 
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disaster lags are also not statistically significant, despite their magnitudes going in the expected 
direction.12 
The results for government revenues and public expenditure are presented in panels B and 
C.  As before, the effect on the change in government revenues concentrates on lower-middle and 
low-income countries, with an estimated negative impact of 0.76% and 1.05%, respectively, in the 
model without lags.  Adding the possibility of lagged effects leaves the estimates of this 
contemporary impact relatively unchanged, at 0.70% for the lower-income group, and 0.94% for 
low-income countries.  The model results do not support the existence of multi-period effects on 
government revenues.  For the case of public expenditure, none of the estimations show 
statistically significant coefficients on the disaster variables. 
2.5.3   Robustness checks 
Besides the benchmark specification, alternative models were estimated to validate the robustness 
of the results.  A known problem of the benchmark model is that it may suffer from endogeneity 
due to the inclusion of the real GDP growth variable (Zeng, 2014).  To avoid this problem, a 
common solution in the literature has been to estimate the model using lags of real GDP growth 
as instrumental variables.  Table 2.3 displays the results of this alternative estimation.  The general 
conclusions regarding the contemporary effect of disasters on the budget balance, government 
revenue and public expenditure, remain largely unchanged when compared to the benchmark 
model.  However, this alternative model does not provide evidence of multi-period effects, as the 
coefficients on the lagged disaster variables are not statistically significant. 
                                                          
12 The coefficient on the second disaster lag is statistically significant if the model is estimated pooling together the 
lower-middle and low-income groups.  This suggests that splitting the sample by income groups may have an 
important effect on the precision of the estimates. 
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Additionally, two dynamic panel models were also estimated, using the methods of 
Arellano-Bond and Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond.13   One of the advantages of these alternative 
specifications is that they allow the inclusion of lags of the depend variable.  The results of these 
models are presented in Tables 2.4 and 2.5.  As was the case of the fixed-effects model with 
instrumental variables, the conclusions derived from these results are largely consistent with the 
benchmark model.  In other words, the coefficients on the contemporary disaster variable are 
statistically significant for the change in the budget balance and government revenues, but not for 
public expenditure.  Interestingly, the dynamic panel models also support the existence of lagged 
effects from extreme weather events, particularly on public expenditure. 
2.5.4   Other potential identification threats 
Besides the endogeneity issue of the real GDP growth variable, and the inclusion of lags of the 
dependent variable as covariates, other potential identification threats are listed and discussed 
below: 
• Misreporting of disaster severity:  Yang (2008) argues that countries may have incentives 
to misreport the severity of disasters in order to receive more international aid.  In the 
context of this analysis, this would result in the possibility of natural disasters being 
misclassified as extreme weather events.  Thus, systematic misreporting of this sort would 
bias down the estimates of the fiscal impact, making the empirical estimates shown a 
lower bound of their true value.14 
                                                          
13 See Arellano and Bond (1991), and Blundell and Bond (1998), respectively. 
14 Future work will deal with this issue by incorporating a hurricane index representing the average hurricane exposure 
of residents of a given country in a particular year, as in Yang (2008). 
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• Definition of the disaster variable:  The definition of which disasters are identified as 
extreme weather events is key for the empirical analysis.  Hence, it could be argued that 
results may be driven by the somewhat arbitrary definition of an extreme weather event. 
For instance, the criteria based in levels, and not proportions, may have very different 
consequences depending on population size.  Changing Criterion 1 to “at least 1% of the 
population” removes the statistical significance of the expenditure lagged effect found in 
the benchmark model, but the contemporary effect on government revenues remains 
consistent with previous results. 
• Period of analysis:  As explained in previous sections, the 2000-2015 period was chosen 
to maximize data availability for the 168 countries in the analysis.  The concern of 
extending this period was that an unbalanced panel could reduce the precision of the 
estimates.  However, restricting the sample to these years may limit the external validity 
of the results, as the empirical evidence may be capturing what could be a temporary fiscal 
impact.  Nonetheless, estimates obtained from extending the period of analysis (1980-
2015, 1985-2015 and 1990-2015) yield similar results to the benchmark model, with some 
minor adjustments in the point estimates. 
• Use of contemporary GDP in dependent variable:  The benchmark model defines the 
dependent variables (budget balance, government revenues, and public expenditure) as 
percentage of contemporary GDP.  This simplifies the interpretation of the estimated 
coefficients for the disaster variables.  However, since contemporary GDP is also being 
affected by the disaster’s occurrence, this procedure may create biases in the results.  
Using an alternative definition, where the denominator is the average of third, fourth and 
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fifth lagged GDP values15, eliminates the statistical significance of the expenditure lagged 
effect, but the contemporary effect on government revenues is still consistent with the 
benchmark model (see Table 2.6). 
2.6. Conclusions 
The occurrence of natural disasters can have large costs in terms of human lives and economic 
damages.  While the literature analyzing the incidence of natural disasters has mainly focused on 
their macroeconomic consequences, the fiscal dimension of this problem has remained relatively 
unexplored.  The few available studies analyzing this issue point out that the effect on the public 
accounts can be important.  This paper finds evidence consistent with this conclusion. 
According to the empirical results, the occurrence of at least one extreme weather event is 
associated with an immediate deterioration of the budget balance of the order of 0.4%-0.9% of 
GDP.  The estimated impact comes primarily from an immediate reduction in government 
revenues, as a percentage of GDP, with adverse effects ranging between 0.5% to 1.1% of GDP.  
This effect is larger for low-income and lower-middle income countries but is not significant for 
high-income and upper-middle income countries.   
Moreover, the models support some evidence of a lagged effect on the budget balance two 
years after the event, with a benchmark estimate of 0.6% of GDP.  This multi-period effect comes 
mainly from an estimated increase of 0.4% of GDP in public expenditure and seems consistent 
with the post-disaster completion of reconstruction work on public infrastructure. However, due 
to data limitations, this paper is unable to test this hypothesis. 
                                                          
15 These GDP lagged values were chosen to allow for the use of the first and second lags of the disaster variable in 
the model. 
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It is important to remark that, despite showing significant fiscal impacts, there are margins 
of response that are not captured by the empirical evidence.  For instance, to the extent that 
countries reallocate planned expenditure in the wake of a disaster, this response would tend to 
decrease the observed incidence of extreme weather events on total public expenditure.16  Indeed, 
the lack of statistically significant effects for the contemporary impact of disasters on the 
expenditure seems likely to point in this direction. 
  
                                                          
16 As mentioned earlier, Benson and Clay (2004) found strong evidence of reallocation in their country-specific 
analyses. 
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2.8. Tables 
Table 2.1 – Fixed-Effects Model Estimation 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Budget Balance Government Revenues Public Expenditure 
(1) FE Model (2) FE Model 
with lags 
(3) FE Model (4) FE Model 
with lags 
(5) FE Model (6) FE Model 
with lags 
∆(debt/GDP)t-1  
 
0.034*** 
(0.011) 
0.035*** 
(0.011) 
  -0.016** 
(0.007) 
-0.016** 
(0.007) 
real GDP growth 0.278*** 
(0.080) 
0.277*** 
(0.080) 
0.155** 
(0.069) 
0.154** 
(0.069) 
-0.118*** 
(0.023) 
-0.118*** 
(0.023) 
inflation 0.031* 
(0.016) 
0.030* 
(0.016) 
0.011  
(0.026) 
0.011 
(0.027) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
ddisaster -0.491** 
(0.218) 
-0.457** 
(0.217) 
-0.584*** 
(0.201) 
-0.550*** 
(0.202) 
-0.091  
(0.195) 
-0.094 
(0.197) 
ddisaster t-1  0.400 
(0.330) 
 0.365 
(0.321) 
 0.021 
(0.171) 
ddisaster t-2  -0.562* 
(0.299) 
 -0.145  
(0.278) 
 0.402* 
(0.213) 
election -0.237 
(0.190) 
-0.241 
(0.190) 
-0.235 
(0.170) 
-0.233 
(0.170) 
0.007 
(0.142) 
0.011 
(0.142) 
constant -1.265*** 
(0.343) 
-1.235*** 
(0.337) 
-0.406  
(0.295) 
-0.451 
(0.288) 
0.860*** 
(0.130) 
0.788*** 
(0.140) 
Observations 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 2,514 
No. of countries 168 168 168 168 168 168 
R-squared 0.0807 0.0829 0.0395 0.0413 0.0246 0.0275 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.2 – Fixed-effects model estimation, by per capita income classification 
Panel A - Dependent variable:  Change in the Budget Balance 
 High-income Upper-middle income Lower-middle income Low-income 
(1) FE Model (2) FE Model 
with lags 
(3) FE Model (4) FE Model 
with lags 
(5) FE Model (6) FE Model 
with lags 
(7) FE Model (8) FE Model 
with lags 
∆(debt/GDP)t-1  
 
0.109 *** 
(0.030) 
0.109*** 
(0.030) 
0.028 
(0.019) 
0.028 
(0.020) 
0.032*** 
(0.011) 
0.033*** 
(0.011) 
0.028 
(0.018) 
0.028 
(0.017) 
real GDP growth t-1 0.508 *** 
(0.090) 
0.509*** 
(0.090) 
0.294** 
(0.123) 
0.294** 
(0.123) 
0.143*** 
(0.037) 
0.144*** 
(0.037) 
0.138*** 
(0.043) 
0.123*** 
(0.037) 
inflation -0.028 
(0.113) 
-0.029 
(0.113) 
0.016  
(0.017) 
0.016 
(0.017) 
0.023 
(0.023) 
0.021 
(0.023) 
0.064** 
(0.025) 
0.066** 
(0.029) 
ddisaster -0.006  
(0.235) 
-0.040 
(0.219) 
-0.033  
(0.471) 
-0.042 
(0.450) 
-0.756** 
(0.369) 
-0.747** 
(0.349) 
-0.898** 
(0.423) 
-0.767* 
(0.419) 
ddisaster t-1  -0.324 
(0.387) 
 0.341 
(0.508) 
 0.087 
(0.439) 
 1.046 
(0.913) 
ddisaster t-2  -0.315 
(0.711) 
 -0.425 
(0.295) 
 -0.501 
(0.361) 
 -1.105 
(0.873) 
election -0.204 
(0.231) 
-0.214 
(0.229) 
-0.546* 
(0.312) 
-0.535* 
(0.309) 
-0.164 
(0.421) 
-0.176 
(0.423) 
-0.142 
(0.862) 
-0.130 
(0.862) 
constant -1.443 *** 
(0.401) 
-1.412*** 
(0.398) 
-1.579*** 
(0.588) 
-1.560*** 
(0.569) 
-0.650** 
(0.313) 
-0.516 
(0.419) 
-0.743** 
(0.308) 
-0.707** 
(0.311) 
Observations 773 773 693 693 644 644 404 404 
No. of countries 49 49 46 46 44 44 29 29 
R-squared 0.0900 0.0900 0.1856 0.1864 0.0284 0.276 0.0400 0.0538 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis.   
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Panel B - Dependent variable:  Change in Government Revenues 
 High-income Upper-middle income Lower-middle income Low-income 
(1) FE Model (2) FE Model 
with lags 
(3) FE Model (4) FE Model 
with lags 
(5) FE Model (6) FE Model 
with lags 
(7) FE Model (8) FE Model 
with lags 
real GDP growth t-1 0.102 
(0.070) 
0.103 
(0.071) 
0.198** 
(0.098) 
0.197** 
(0.098) 
0.052 
(0.039) 
0.053 
(0.039) 
0.096* 
(0.051) 
0.085* 
(0.049) 
inflation 0.025 
(0.058) 
0.024 
(0.058) 
-0.029* 
(0.015) 
-0.028* 
(0.014) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
-0.014 
(0.021) 
0.136* 
(0.069) 
0.137* 
(0.071) 
ddisaster -0.357 
(0.314) 
-0.416 
(0.345) 
-0.161 
(0.155) 
-0.166 
(0.176) 
-0.762** 
(0.371) 
-0.703** 
(0.345) 
-1.050** 
(0.456) 
-0.944* 
(0.493) 
ddisaster t-1  -0.396 
(0.321) 
 0.217 
(0.469) 
 0.279 
(0.398) 
 0.857  
(0.956) 
ddisaster t-2  0.138 
(0.489) 
 0.071 
(0.288) 
 -0.151 
(0.320) 
 -0.708 
(0.781) 
election -0.308* 
(0.170) 
-0.304* 
(0.166) 
-0.101 
(0.245) 
-0.096 
(0.250) 
-0.114 
(0.383) 
-0.119 
(0.382) 
-0.612 
(0.824) 
-0.605 
(0.817) 
constant -0.222 
(0.248) 
-0.213 
(0.245) 
-0.646 
(0.437) 
-0.697 
(0.431) 
0.247 
(0.288) 
0.181 
(0.308) 
-0.586 
(0.527) 
-0.606 
(0.561) 
Observations 773 773 693 693 644 644 404 404 
No. of countries 49 49 46 46 44 44 29 29 
R-squared  0.0096  0.1659  0.0088  0.0651 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis.   
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Panel C - Dependent variable:  Change in Public Expenditure 
 High-income Upper-middle income Lower-middle income Low-income 
(1) FE Model (2) FE Model 
with lags 
(3) FE Model (4) FE Model 
with lags 
(5) FE Model (6) FE Model 
with lags 
(7) FE Model (8) FE Model 
with lags 
∆(debt/GDP)t-1  
 
-0.097*** 
(0.024) 
0.097*** 
(0.024) 
-0.021 
(0.021) 
-0.022 
(0.021) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
real GDP growth t-1 -0.400 *** 
(0.041) 
0.401*** 
(0.041) 
-0.096*** 
(0.030) 
-0.096*** 
(0.300) 
-0.084* 
(0.043) 
-0.084* 
(0.043) 
-0.028 
(0.050) 
-0.024 
(0.050) 
inflation 0.053 
(0.080) 
-0.054 
(0.080) 
-0.044** 
(0.017) 
-0.043** 
(0.017) 
-0.044** 
(0.020) 
-0.044** 
(0.020) 
0.072 
(0.046) 
0.072 
(0.045) 
ddisaster -0.342 
(0.353) 
-0.385 
(0.357) 
-0.128 
(0.467) 
-0.122 
(0.475) 
0.021 
(0.260) 
0.070 
(0.287) 
-0.159 
(0.383) 
-0.184 
(0.386) 
ddisaster t-1  -0.075 
(0.332) 
 -0.117 
(0.236) 
 0.208 
(0.296) 
 -0.187 
(0.443) 
ddisaster t-2  0.461 
(0.575) 
 0.493 
(0.352) 
 0.304 
(0.353) 
 0.407 
(0.477) 
election -0.109 
(0.195) 
-0.095 
(0.194) 
0.434 
(0.336) 
0.427 
(0.336) 
0.058 
(0.257) 
0.062 
(0.257) 
-0.373 
(0.417) 
-0.379 
(0.424) 
constant 1.194*** 
(0.203) 
1.171*** 
(0.206) 
0.933** 
(0.207) 
0.863*** 
(0.231) 
0.937*** 
(0.261) 
0.752** 
(0.332) 
0.167 
(0.325) 
0.108 
(0.361) 
Observations 773 773 693 693 644 644 404 404 
No. of countries 49 49 46 46 44 44 29 29 
R-squared  0.1671  0.0415  0.0166  0.0496 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.3 – Fixed-Effects Model Estimation with Instrumental Variables 
 Budget Balance Government Revenues Public Expenditure 
(1) IV-FE 
Model 
(2) IV-FE 
Model with 
lags 
(3) IV-FE 
Model 
(4) IV-FE 
Model with 
lags 
(5) IV-FE 
Model 
(6) IV-FE 
Model with 
lags 
∆(debt/GDP)t-1  
 
0.016 
(0.013) 
0.016 
(0.013) 
  -0.004 
(0.007) 
-0.004 
(0.007) 
real GDP growth t-1 -0.079 
(0.080) 
-0.077 
(0.081) 
-0.013 
(0.036) 
-0.012  
(0.036) 
0.073* 
(0.043) 
0.072*  
(0.043) 
inflation 0.022  
(0.017) 
0.022 
(0.017) 
0.005 
(0.027) 
-0.005 
(0.027) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
-0.017 
(0.018) 
ddisaster -0.617*** 
(0.210) 
-0.576*** 
(0.207) 
-0.643*** 
(0.201) 
-0.607*** 
(0.200) 
-0.026 
(0.184) 
-0.029 
(0.186) 
ddisaster t-1  0.476 
(0.330) 
 0.430 
(0.318) 
 -0.033 
(0.170) 
ddisaster t-2  -0.502 
(0.310) 
 -0.137 
(0.276) 
 0.350 
(0.216) 
election -0.174 
(0.198) 
-0.177 
(0.199) 
-0.196 
(0.169) 
-0.196 
(0.169) 
-0.026 
(0.184) 
-0.016  
(0.146) 
constant 0.240 
(0.372) 
0.231 
(0.377) 
0.318 
(0.246) 
0.255 
(0.246) 
0.019 
(0.211) 
-0.008 
(0.216) 
Observations 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 2,513 
No. of countries 168 168 168 168 168 168 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.4 – Dynamic Panel Estimation (Arellano-Bond) 
 Budget Balance Government Revenues Public Expenditure 
(1) A-B 
Model 
(2) A-B 
Model with 
lags 
(3) A-B 
Model 
(4) A-B 
Model with 
lags 
(5) A-B 
Model 
(6) A-B 
Model with 
lags 
LD. balance -0.243*** 
(0.033) 
-0.238*** 
(0.032) 
    
LD. revenue   -0.287*** 
(0.040) 
-0.285*** 
(0.039) 
  
LD. expenditure     -0.139*** 
(0.043) 
-0.137*** 
(0.044) 
LD. debt 0.022** 
(0.010) 
0.023** 
(0.010) 
  -0.013* 
(0.008) 
-0.014* 
(0.008) 
realgdp_growth 0.271*** 
(0.068) 
0.275*** 
(0.070) 
0.139** 
(0.060) 
0.143** 
(0.060) 
-0.126*** 
(0.019) 
-0.130*** 
(0.020) 
inflend 0.039* 
(0.020) 
0.042** 
(0.021) 
0.007 
(0.027) 
0.008 
(0.026) 
-0.033 
(0.022) 
-0.036 
(0.028) 
ddummy -0.391* 
(0.206) 
-0.470* 
(0.284) 
-0.458** 
(0.189) 
-0.524** 
(0.234) 
-0.128 
(0.203) 
-0.072 
(0.283) 
L.ddummy  0.656 
(0.498) 
 0.323 
(0.448) 
 -0.190 
(0.278) 
L2.ddummy  -0.392 
(0.261) 
 -0.009 
(0.234) 
 0.467** 
(0.218) 
election -0.311* 
(0.169) 
-0.331* 
(0.173) 
-0.201 
(0.148) 
-0.186 
(0.146) 
0.084 
(0.132) 
0.080 
(0.133) 
constant -1.294*** 
(0.313) 
-1.359*** 
(0.329) 
-0.293 
(0.268) 
-0.362 
(0.273) 
0.987*** 
(0.133) 
0.958*** 
(0.153) 
Observations 2,440 2,440 2,486 2,486 2,442 2,442 
No. of countries 168 168 168 168 168 168 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.5 – Dynamic Panel Estimation (Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond) 
 Budget Balance Government Revenues Public Expenditure 
(i) System 
GMM model 
(ii) System 
GMM model 
with lags 
(i) System 
GMM model 
(ii) System 
GMM model 
with lags 
(i) System 
GMM model 
(ii) System 
GMM model 
with lags 
LD. balance -0.215*** 
(0.030) 
-0.208*** 
(0.030) 
    
LD. revenue   -0.267*** 
(0.041) 
-0.265*** 
(0.041) 
  
LD. expenditure     -0.099** 
(0.044) 
-0.096** 
(0.045) 
LD. debt 0.025** 
(0.011) 
0.027** 
(0.012) 
  -0.017* 
(0.009) 
-0.017* 
(0.010) 
realgdp_growth 0.297*** 
(0.076) 
0.301*** 
(0.078) 
0.139** 
(0.068) 
0.140** 
(0.069) 
-0.128*** 
(0.019) 
-0.133*** 
(0.020) 
inflend 0.047** 
(0.022) 
0.050** 
(0.023) 
0.016 
(0.036) 
0.017 
(0.036) 
-0.022 
(0.029) 
-0.024 
(0.030) 
ddummy -0.575** 
(0.226) 
-0.805** 
(0.316) 
-0.535** 
(0.211) 
-0.713*** 
(0.252) 
-0.058 
(0.188) 
0.083 
(0.269) 
L.ddummy  0.539 
(0.490) 
 0.638 
(0.437) 
 0.058 
(0.262) 
L2.ddummy  -0.521* 
(0.276) 
 0.180 
(0.259) 
 0.696*** 
(0.237) 
election -0.384** 
(0.172) 
-0.405** 
(0.176) 
-0.196 
(0.146) 
-0.192 
(0.146 
0.129 
(0.135) 
0.132 
(0.136) 
constant -1.393*** 
(0.344) 
-1.387*** 
(0.377) 
-0.334 
(0.323) 
-0.462 
(0.353) 
0.897*** 
(0.166) 
0.765*** 
(0.191) 
Observations 2,508 2,508 2,510 2,510 2,509 2,509 
No. of countries 168 168 168 168 168 168 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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Table 2.6 – Fixed Effects Model Estimation with Average Lagged GDP Values in Dependent Variable  
Explanatory 
Variable 
Budget Balance Government Revenues Public Expenditure 
(1) FE Model (2) FE Model 
with lags 
(3) FE Model (4) FE Model 
with lags 
(5) FE Model (6) FE Model 
with lags 
∆(debt/avgLGDP)t-1  
 
0.016 
(0.022) 
0.017 
(0.022) 
  -0.030*** 
(0.012) 
-0.030*** 
(0.012) 
real GDP growth 0.364*** 
(0.050) 
0.363*** 
(0.050) 
0.856***  
(0.126) 
0.856***  
(0.126) 
0.493*** 
(0.118) 
0.497*** 
(0.119) 
inflation 0.060** 
(0.025) 
0.059** 
(0.016) 
0.057 
(0.037) 
0.056 
(0.037) 
-0.001 
(0.039) 
-0.002 
(0.039) 
ddisaster -0.838* 
(0.435) 
- 0.754* 
(0.433) 
-1.248* 
(0.692) 
-1.200* 
(0.680) 
-0.361  
(0.754) 
-0.395  
(0.755) 
ddisaster t-1  0.962 
(0.602) 
 0.547 
(0.703) 
 -0.398 
(0.527) 
ddisaster t-2  -0.768 
(0.505) 
 -0.722 
(0.651) 
 0.045  
(0.415) 
election -0.501 
(0.344) 
-0.507 
(0.345) 
-0.164 
(0.404) 
-0.170 
(0.407) 
0.392 
(0.363) 
0.391 
(0.369) 
constant -1.677*** 
(0.271) 
-1.712*** 
(0.263) 
-3.650*** 
(0.606) 
-3.615*** 
(0.656) 
-1.970*** 
(0.576) 
-1.904*** 
(0.592) 
Observations 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 2,484 
No. of countries 167 167 167 167 167 167 
R-squared 0.0434 0.0456 0.1232 0.0413 0.0849 0.0849 
Notes: * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level.  Standard errors in parenthesis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Tax arbitrage and domestic profit-shifting in environments  
with co-existing income tax regimes 
 
3.1. Introduction 
This paper explores the consequences of having two co-existing corporate income tax 
regimes within a domestic tax system. This topic is interesting because, in such scenarios, a simple 
theoretical model predicts an optimal strategy involving tax arbitrage through income shifting 
across regimes.  Until now, much of the literature on domestic income shifting has focused on 
advanced economies, and on the shifting between labor income and corporate income [e.g. Gordon 
et al. (1995), Slemrod (1995), Gordon and Slemrod (1998), Pirttilä and Selin (2011), Harju and 
Matikka (2016)].  Only recently, researchers have devoted their attention to the developing world 
[e.g. Shevlin et al (2012), Foremny et al. (2018)], where countries often harbor multiple income 
tax regimes, including special simplified regimes aimed at combating informality by reducing the 
costs of compliance. 
The present study contributes to this body of literature by analyzing the case of Guatemala.  
Using tax administrative data from 2010 to 2015, the empirical analysis focuses on the 
identification of behavioral responses consistent with tax arbitrage between the two parallel 
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income tax regimes in the country. Under Guatemalan tax law, firms are allowed to choose 
between a tax on profits –Regimen Optativo–, or a tax on turnover –Regimen General–.  In theory, 
profit-maximizing firms are expected to choose the regime where their tax liability is lowest, 
conditional on output.  In practice, there is anecdotal evidence that firms engage in tax arbitrage 
by creating a network of legal entities in both regimes.  In its simplest form, firms start by creating 
one entity in each regime.  Then, they take advantage of the tax arbitrage opportunity by carry out 
profit shifting from Regimen Optativo to Regimen Simplificado.1 
The Guatemalan case provides an interesting setting for two reasons. First, contrary to what 
is usually found in other countries, there are no big barriers for firms to switch regimes after their 
initial choice.  Firms are able to adjust their choice before the start of each fiscal year.  This differs 
from the standard practice observed in other countries with co-existing regimes, where firms are 
unable to switch with such ease after their initial choice at the time of registration.  Second, in 
2013 there was an income tax reform that modified the marginal tax rates in each of the two 
existing regimes —from 31% to 25% in Regimen Optativo, and from 5% to 7% in Regimen 
General.  As a result, firms’ incentives to choose each regime changed differentially depending on 
their use of tax arbitrage schemes or not.  On the one hand, the theoretical model developed in 
Section 2 predicts that, after the reform, firms belonging to a tax arbitrage network should not 
show any switching behavior.  On the other, firms with no such networks should show some 
migration from Regimen General to Regimen Optativo. 
To test this empirically, the analysis uses the variation in marginal tax rates introduced by 
the reform, as well as three different network definitions to group firms.  Graphical evidence 
                                                          
1 In other countries with similar regimes, it is also common to observe large marginal tax rate differentials between 
profit taxation and turnover taxation.  See Section 3 for a full description of the Guatemalan case. 
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largely confirms the predicted patterns for the alternative network definitions.  Following a 
difference-in-difference approach, where treatment and control groups are defined by whether 
firms belong to a tax arbitrage network or not, the results show differential behavior between the 
two groups.  For the baseline model, firms that do not belong to a tax arbitrage network faced a 
decrease of around one percentage point more than the treatment group in the probability of 
registering in Regimen General after the reform.  Extending the baseline model to a generalized 
difference-in-difference yields similar results.  However, the analysis shows that the effect seems 
to be concentrated on lower income firms, despite higher income firms having larger incentives to 
react.  Finally, it is acknowledged that, with data limitations preventing further analysis, these 
empirical results should only be interpreted as indirect evidence of profit shifting and the existence 
of tax arbitrage networks in Guatemala.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the theoretical model used 
to obtain behavioral predictions for firms with and without tax arbitrage networks. Section 3 
describes the data used in the analysis, the income tax regimes in Guatemala, and the implications 
of the 2013 income tax reform.  Section 4 explains the empirical methodology, while the results 
are presented in Section 5.  Finally, the conclusions and policy implications of these findings are 
discussed in Section 6. 
3.2. Theoretical Model 
To understand the factors affecting firm behavior, this section presents a theoretical framework in 
which firms face incentives created by a system with two parallel income tax regimes.  First, a 
basic profit maximization model is used to understand incentives for firms under a tax on profits 
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and a tax on turnover, separately.  Then, the case of a network of two firms which operate jointly, 
one in each regime, is presented.     
3.2.1. A simple model of profit maximization 
Let 𝑦 represent output, 𝑐(𝑦) the total cost function –increasing in output level–, 𝜏𝜋 the marginal 
tax rate on profits, and 𝜏𝑦 the marginal tax rate on turnover.
2  Furthermore, let us suppose that 
there are two alternative tax regimes that firms can opt for, one in which firms pay taxes on profits 
and another one in which firms pay taxes on turnover.  Under this very simple framework, we can 
express the firm’s profit maximization problem as follows.3  Firms registering in the profit tax 
regime maximize4, 
 max
𝑦 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦)), (1) 
while for firms in the turnover tax regime, the maximization problem would be, 
 max
𝑦 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝑦𝑦. (2) 
The first order conditions for an interior solution to these problems are, respectively, 
 1 = 𝑐′(𝑦) (3) 
 1 − 𝜏𝑦 = 𝑐
′(𝑦), (4) 
which imply that a profits tax is production efficient, but a turnover tax is distortionary.  
                                                          
2 The words output and turnover are used interchangeable in the models and equations of this paper.  Although in 
reality these terms differ, the aforementioned convention follows from a normalization of the price level used to define 
turnover. 
3 For simplicity, the model presented here does not account for the possibility of turnover and/or cost misreporting.  
An extension including these margins of adjustment is shown further into the paper, yielding similar conclusions. 
4 Although the model assumes all costs are deductible (i.e. a pure profit tax), in practice, tax systems feature non-
deductible costs. 
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Under profit maximization, firms will choose to register in the regime where their after-tax 
profits are expected to be higher.  Hence, conditional on expected output, firms should opt to 
register in the regime that taxes profits if, 
  𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦)) ≥ 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝑦𝑦,  
which implies, 
  
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
≥
(𝑦−𝑐(𝑦))
𝑦
.  (5)
  
The left-hand side of the inequality above is the ratio of marginal tax rates.  The right-hand side is 
the firm’s profit margin, a measure of profitability.  In practice, it is common for 𝜏𝑦 to be 
significantly smaller than 𝜏𝜋.  Thus, this simple theoretical model implies that, other things equal, 
firms with low expected profitability are more likely to choose to pay taxes on profits, while firms 
with high expected profitability will prefer to pay taxes on turnover.  
 Suppose that the government approves a fiscal reform in which the marginal tax rate on 
profits decreases to 𝜏𝜋
′ and the marginal tax rate on turnover increases to  𝜏𝑦
′.  In this scenario, 
there is a change in the threshold defined by the ratio of the marginal tax rates, since 
  
𝜏𝑦
′
𝜏𝜋′
>
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
.  
Therefore, under the assumption of stable profitability, it would be expected that firms with a profit 
margin just above the old threshold should now face incentives to switch regime. Specifically, 
these firms would have incentives to move from the turnover tax regime to the profit tax regime, 
as they would expect to pay less taxes by doing so.  These incentives are asymmetric, in the sense 
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that only firms above the profit margin threshold defined by the marginal tax rates will be affected.  
Firms below the threshold do not have any change in incentives. 
3.2.2. Tax arbitrage and profit-shifting between regimes 
In the previous framework firms are assumed to choose between two mutually exclusive income 
tax regimes.  However, it is not uncommon to come across anecdotal evidence in developing 
countries pointing to strategies to carry out tax arbitrage between two co-existing regimes. 
 In order to analyze this possibility, let us consider a case where a firm decides to split its 
reported activities into two legal entities.  One entity is registered as a firm in the profit tax regime 
and the other as a firm in the turnover tax regime.  The joint maximization problem of these two 
newly created firms can be expressed as, 
 max
𝑦,𝑑 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝜋(𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝑑) − 𝜏𝑦𝑑 − 𝑘(𝑑), (6) 
where 𝑑 represents the amount of profits transferred by the firm in the profits tax regime to the 
firm in the turnover tax regime.5  Moreover, this group of firms incur transaction costs, 𝑘(𝑑), 
which account for the expenses involved in transferring profits between firms; these transaction 
costs are increasing in the amount being shifted.   
 Since the optimization is now carried out over two variables, namely turnover and 
transferred profits, there are two first order conditions associated with an interior solution, 
 𝜕𝑦:      1 = 𝑐′(𝑦) (7) 
                                                          
5 This model specification views profit shifting as an administrative arrangement.  It implies that the production 
technology used by the firm is unaffected by its decision to split into two legal entities.   
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 𝜕𝑑:      𝜏𝜋 − 𝜏𝑦 = 𝑘′(𝑑). (8) 
Equation (7) replicates the first order condition shown in equation (3) and indicates that under this 
arrangement the (joint) firm’s production choice is still independent of the marginal tax rates.  This 
is interesting, since a turnover tax is distortionary, as seen in equation (4).  Yet, when firms are 
able to operate in both regimes through two legal entities, then the distortionary nature of turnover 
taxation does not affect the (joint) firm’s decision.6  On the other hand, equation (8) defines the 
optimal level of profits that should be shifted to the firm in the turnover tax regime.  The left-hand 
side is a measure of the marginal benefit of profit transfers between the firms, while the right-hand 
side is the marginal cost of this transfer.  The condition is intuitive, as it relates the amount shifted 
to the tax rate differential between the two regimes.  In other words, the larger is the difference in 
the marginal tax rates, the greater are the gains to engage in tax arbitrage through profit shifting. 
 Let us consider what would happen with a similar tax reform as the one described in the 
previous section.  Since now 𝜏𝜋
′ < 𝜏𝜋 and 𝜏𝑦
′ > 𝜏𝑦, then the tax differential has decreased, 
 𝜏𝜋
′ − 𝜏𝑦
′ < 𝜏𝜋 − 𝜏𝑦. 
Firms will respond by reducing the amount of profits being shifted from the profits tax regime to 
the turnover tax regime.  However, as long as the differential remains positive, firms will continue 
to have an incentive to engage in tax arbitrage.  Provided that the amount of profits shifted is 
positive before and after the reform, the main implication is that these firms will not switch regimes 
as firms without a tax arbitrage network would do. 
                                                          
6 The two key assumptions here are, (i) that production technology is unchanged by the firm’s administrative 
arrangement, as discussed before; and, (ii) that the cost of profit shifting does not depend on output level. 
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3.2.3. Robustness of the model to turnover and cost misreporting 
The simple model presented above can also be extended to account for the possibility of turnover 
and cost misreporting.  Let ?̂? and ?̂? denote reported turnover and reported costs, respectively, and 
ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) represent the convex costs of misreporting.   
 Firms that opt for the profits tax regime solve, 
 max
𝑦,?̂?,𝑐̂ 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝜋(?̂? − ?̂?) − ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐), (9) 
where the firm has two additional margins of adjustment instead of only output.  The following 
are the first order conditions for an interior solution, 
 𝜕𝑦:      1 − ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) = 𝑐
′(𝑦)[1 − ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐)] (10) 
 𝜕?̂?:      𝜏𝜋 = ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) (11) 
 𝜕?̂?:      𝜏𝜋 = ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐). (12) 
As before, these conditions put together imply, 
1 = 𝑐′(𝑦), 
which was the result obtained in the case with no misreporting. 
 On the other hand, firms opting to pay the tax on turnover evaluate, 
 max
𝑦,?̂?,𝑐̂ 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝑦?̂? − ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐), (13) 
which yields as first order conditions, 
 𝜕𝑦:      1 − ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) = 𝑐
′(𝑦)[1 − ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐)] (14) 
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 𝜕?̂?:      𝜏𝑦 = ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) (15) 
 𝜕?̂?:      0 ≤ ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐). (16) 
Once again, when taken together these conditions imply the same result as the case with no 
misreporting, 
1 − 𝜏𝑦 = 𝑐
′(𝑦), 
since the optimal amount of cost misreporting, defined by equation (12), is  ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦) = 0.7 
 Finally, firms that engage in tax arbitrage by splitting into two legal entities solve, 
 max
𝑦,?̂?,𝑐̂,𝑑 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝜏𝜋(?̂? − ?̂? − 𝑑) − 𝜏𝑦𝑑 − ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) − 𝑘(𝑑). (17) 
The first order conditions for an interior solution replicate equations (8), (10), (11), and (12), 
ensuring that the main properties of the model remain the same.  In particular, the tax system 
continues to be non-distortionary to production for the same reasons discussed earlier in the paper.8  
Additionally, equations (8), (11), and (12) imply, 
𝜏𝜋 = ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) = ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) = 𝜏𝑦 + 𝑘′(𝑑), 
which simply states that the marginal benefit of turnover and cost misreporting should equal that 
of profit shifting, as otherwise the (joint) firms can rearrange its reporting and profit transferring 
decisions to increase overall profits.  
 
                                                          
7 The functional form of ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐) is assumed to be such that ℎ𝑦−?̂?(0, ?̂? − 𝑐) > 0, ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, 0) > 0, and 
ℎ(0,0) = 0. 
8 Besides the assumptions highlighted earlier, it is important to clarify that this theoretical result also relies on the 
profits tax being non-distortionary, a condition which may not be verified in practice. 
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3.3. Context and Data 
3.3.1. Corporate income tax regimes in Guatemala 
According to Guatemalan tax law, there are two coexisting and mutually exclusive income tax 
regimes where a firm can register to fulfill its tax obligations.  The first is Regimen General, a 
regime in which taxes are paid on the amount of reported turnover.  The second is Regimen 
Optativo, where taxes are levied on firms’ profits.9  When a firm enters the Tax Registry for the 
first time, it must choose which income tax regime to belong to. Once in the registry, firms are 
allowed to switch regime before the beginning of each fiscal year. 
 Prior to 2013, firms in Regimen General paid a flat marginal income tax rate of 5% on 
turnover, while in Regimen Optativo the marginal tax rate was 31% on profits.  The 2013 fiscal 
reform altered these marginal tax rates.  The marginal tax rate on the former regime increased up 
to 7%, depending on turnover, and the marginal tax rate on the latter regime decreased to 25%.  
Table 3.1 summarizes this information and shows the marginal tax rates during the transition 
period. 
3.3.2. Data 
The data used in this analysis comes from a panel database of Guatemalan tax administrative 
records. This dataset contains the universe of corporate income tax returns filed annually under 
Regimen General and Regimen Optativo for the years 2010 to 2015.  Moreover, this data is 
complemented by a database with information on firms’ registered accountant and legal 
                                                          
9 After the 2013 tax reform, Regimen General was renamed to Regimen Opcional Simplificado sobre Ingresos, while 
Regimen Optativo became known as Regimen sobre las Utilidades. 
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representative.10  As it will be explained in the empirical section, this latter dataset allows the 
creation of a proxy for whether firms belong to a network of related firms or not. 
Consistency checks were carried out to ensure basic reliability of the data, which resulted 
in some observations being dropped.  Non-commercial firms are excluded from the main sample 
due to their non-for-profit nature.  Table 3.2 provides summary statistics for the final sample under 
analysis. 
3.4. Empirical Strategy  
This section discusses the empirical strategy to test some of the predictions of the theoretical model 
presented in Section 2, and shows the results found after carrying out this empirical exercise.  First, 
it shows the procedure used to separate firms according to whether they are likely to be part of a 
network of related firms, or not.  Then, it defines treatment and control groups, according to their 
network characteristics.  Finally, it presents the difference-in-difference model which is used to 
obtain the empirical results. 
3.4.1. Identification of networks of related firms 
The model presented in Section 2 predicts that firms operating in only one income tax regime 
should respond differently to a change in marginal tax rates than firms belonging to a network of 
related firms operating in two income tax regimes simultaneously.  As explained earlier, this is 
because the latter type of firms has incentives to engage in profit shifting between regimes and 
exploit tax arbitrage opportunities.   
                                                          
10 Following common practice, the information in both datasets has been anonymized by the Guatemalan Tax 
Authority. 
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 Hence, one important step in the empirical exercise is to separate firms according to 
whether they are part of such networks or not.  Direct identification would require, at a minimum, 
information about firms’ transactions with each other.  While records of these interactions may be 
accessible in advanced economies, one of the challenges of data from developing countries is that 
this information is either unavailable or incomplete.  Such is the case for the Guatemalan setting 
studied here. 
 In the absence of a direct method to categorize firms, this paper follows an alternative –
albeit indirect– identification strategy.  Firms are grouped according to their probability of being 
part of a network of related firms.  The reasoning followed here is that it seems plausible to argue 
that if two firms share (i) accountant, (ii) legal representative, or (iii) both accountant and legal 
representative, they are more likely to be related than two firms not sharing any of these 
individuals.  Therefore, those three grouping definitions are used in the empirical analysis as 
indirect ways to identify tax arbitrage networks. Provided that separating firms using this 
procedure correctly identifies related firms on average, the empirical results should be informative 
about the differential behavior caused by the Guatemalan income tax reform on regime choice. 
 A further refinement to the above grouping definitions arises from the realization that some 
networks of firms may only operate in the same regime.  These one-regime networks do not have 
observable direct opportunities to engage in tax arbitrage and, thus, are considered to have different 
incentives than two-regimes networks.  In other words, the distinction between one-regime and 
two-regimes networks is important because only firms with a network that covers both regimes 
would be expected to benefit from income shifting.  
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3.4.2. Definition of treatment and control groups 
For the rest of the paper, treatment and control groups are defined in the following manner.  
Conditional on the type of network (i.e. by accountant, by legal representative, or by both), the 
treatment group includes firms that belong to a two-regimes network.  By definition, this excludes 
firms in one-regime networks, as well as all unrelated firms.  Nonetheless, for practical purposes 
the control group only includes the latter firms.   
 There are two main arguments behind this rationale. First, from a conceptual point of view, 
firms in one-regime networks may still be indirectly involved in two-regimes networks. For 
instance, a firm related by its accountant only to a one-regime network, may also be related by its 
legal representative to a different network which operates in the excluded regime.  Second, from a 
methodological perspective, one-regime networks seem to have different characteristics than the 
other two groups.11 As a consequence, the parallel trends assumption needed by the differences-
in-differences approach used in the empirical analysis is likely to be violated.  Hence, both of these 
issues could lead to problems of identification if one-regime networks are included as either part 
of the control or treatment groups. 
3.4.3. Empirical model 
Based on the network definitions above, the empirical analysis relies on the following difference-
in-difference model to identify the effect of the Guatemalan income tax reform on regime choice,     
 𝑅𝐺𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 × 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 
 +𝛽4𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜈𝑖𝑡 (18) 
                                                          
11 See the discussion about this issue in Section 5. 
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where, 𝑅𝐺𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that captures whether firm  𝑖  is registered in Regimen General
12 
or not at time 𝑡;  𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖 is a dummy variable that equals one if firm  𝑖  belongs to the treatment 
group under analysis;  𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals one for the post-reform period 
(i.e. from 2013 onwards);  𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡  corresponds to the value in Quetzales of firm 𝑖 ’s reported 
turnover at time  𝑡;  and, 𝜈𝑖𝑡 is the error term.  The coefficient  𝛽3 is the object of interest, as it 
captures the differential behavior between treatment and control group caused by the introduction 
of the tax reform.  The model’s causal interpretation of   𝛽3  relies on the assumption of parallel 
trends for both groups before the reform.  The plausibility of this assumption will be discussed in 
the next section. 
3.5. Empirical Results 
3.5.1. Firms’ registration in Regimen General by network type 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution over time of firm’s registration in Regimen General by network 
type.  The shaded area in each graph corresponds to the post-reform period.  Panel (a) presents the 
share of firms registered in Regimen General, according to whether firms are related by a common 
accountant. As predicted by the model, the share of unrelated firms, and firms operating within a 
one-regime network, shows a marked decrease immediately after the 2013 reform.  On the other 
hand, firms in a network covering both regimes seem to be less reactive to this change, but still 
show a significant fall in their share.  Panel (b) repeats the same exercise for firms related by a 
common legal representative.  As before, unrelated firms, and firms in a one-regime network 
experience a marked decrease after the reform, but in this case firms in two-regimes networks do 
not show any noteworthy response.  Finally, panel (c) examines the shares for firms related by 
                                                          
12 Since regime choice is mutually exclusive, a firm that is not registered in Regimen General must be registered in 
Regimen Optativo. 
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both a common accountant and a legal representative.  Similar to panel (b), each group’s behavior 
seems consistent with the theoretical predictions of the model.  
A final observation regarding Figure 3.1, is that the graphical evidence suggests the 
existence of parallel trends between unrelated and two-regimes firms, but not for one-regime 
networks.  This evidence supports the use of unrelated firms as a control group, and of firms in 
two-regimes networks as the treatment group.  As this evidence is suggestive only, in the next 
section this intuition will be formalized by a more rigorous analysis of these patterns. 
3.5.2. Results of the baseline difference-in-difference estimation 
Table 3.3 summarizes the results of estimating the baseline difference-in-difference model 
presented in equation (18).  According to these estimates, the impact of the income tax reform on 
regime choice ranges between 0.79 and 1.15 percentage points.  Since in this setting the treatment 
group consists of firms belonging to a two-regimes network –which by the nature of the treatment 
remain unresponsive to the reform–, these coefficients represent a decrease in an unrelated firm’s 
probability of registering in Regimen General.  The direction of the effect is in line with the 
prediction of the theoretical model. 
To test the parallel trends assumption in this model, a placebo reform dummy was 
introduced.  This placebo reform dummy is equal to one for the year 2012, and zero for previous 
years.  For the model to be consistent with the parallel trends assumption, the 𝛽3 coefficient must 
not be significantly different than zero when the model is run for the pre-reform period only.  As 
seen in Table 3.3, the estimated coefficients support this assumption for the cases of networks 
linked by accountant only, and by accountant and legal representative, but not when defined by 
legal representative only. 
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3.5.3. Results of the generalized difference-in-difference estimation 
The baseline model estimates capture the effect of the reform on regime choice for the post-reform 
period as a whole. However, as shown in Table 3.1, the reform was rolled in between 2013 and 
2015, with marginal tax rates changing every year during that period.  For this reason, a generalized 
difference-in-difference model was estimated, with treatment and control groups as defined before, 
as well as dummies for each pre-reform and post-reform year.13 
 Figure 3.2 plots the difference-in-difference coefficients resulting from estimating this 
model.  As seen in the graphs, the estimates suggest that the biggest impact occurred in 2013, with 
only slight differences in the following years.  For networks linked by accountant (panel A), the 
average effect is around 1.2 percentage points; for networks linked by legal representative (panel 
B) this average is about 0.6 percentage points; and for networks linked by both accountant and 
legal representative (panel C), the estimated average impact is 1.1 percentage points.  These 
magnitudes are similar to the baseline model. 
3.5.4. Heterogeneity of the response by income groups 
Besides the transitional adjustment of the marginal tax rates in the post-reform period, Table 3.1 
also shows that income groups were affected differentially.  Firms with a monthly income below 
Q.30,000 faced a slightly lower marginal turnover tax than firms with larger income.  Since the 
available data does not contain monthly income data, firms were separated by their annual income 
into two categories to analyze the potential heterogeneous effect of the reform.  The lower income 
category corresponds to an annual income below Q360,000 (about US$45,000 at the time), while 
                                                          
13 The excluded period is 2012, so as to measure the impacts relative to that year. 
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the higher income category consists of firms with income larger than that amount.14  The results 
for each income group are shown in Figure 3.3.  
 As shown in the graphs, there are heterogeneous effects of the reform.  These effects 
concentrate on firms with lower income, while there does not seem to be any differential impact 
on higher income firms.  For the former group, the magnitude of the coefficients is slightly higher 
than those obtained in the previous section, ranging between 0.6 to 1.6 percentage points, 
depending on the network definition.  The results are somewhat surprising, because higher income 
firms faced larger adjustment in marginal income tax rates.15  Part of the explanation could be that 
higher income firms also tend to have lower reported profit margins, which mean that, on average, 
fewer of them were closer to the switching threshold before and after the reform.  On the other 
hand, higher income firms could also be more likely to belong to two-regimes networks indirectly.  
In such case, the distinction between treatment and control group would be difficult to attain by 
defining networks using accountants and legal representatives directly.  Finally, higher income 
firms may also have additional margins of adjustment unavailable to lower income firms, and this 
may be playing a role in firms’ behavior.   
3.6. Conclusions 
This paper explored the consequences of having two co-existing corporate income tax regimes 
within a domestic tax system.  The theoretical model developed in Section 2, predicts that firms 
belonging to a two-regimes network should not alter their choice of regime in response to a change 
in marginal tax rates.  Instead, the model predicts that unrelated firms should be the ones reacting 
to such a change.  Following a difference-in-difference approach, where treatment and control 
                                                          
14 The chosen annual amount represents what a firm would earn per year if its average monthly income was Q.30,000. 
15 See Table 3.1. 
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groups are defined by whether firms belong to a two-regimes network or not, the results show 
differential behavior between the two groups as predicted by theory.  According to the estimates, 
the reform had a negative effect of about one percentage point on the probability of registering in 
Regimen General for unrelated firms.  Most of the impact seems to have taken place among lower 
income firms, despite higher income firms facing larger adjustments in the turnover marginal tax 
rates.  While overall the behavioral responses of treatment and control groups are consistent with 
the theoretical predictions, it is acknowledged that these empirical results only provide indirect 
evidence of profit shifting and the existence of tax arbitrage networks in Guatemala.   
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Figure 3.1 – Firms Registered in Regimen General by Network Type
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Figure 3.2 – Generalized difference-in-difference coefficients, by network type 
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Figure 3.3 – Heterogeneity by income groups 
A. By Accountant Network 
   
B. By Legal Representative Network 
   
C. By Accountant and Legal Representative Network 
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Table 3.1 – Marginal Income Tax Rates Before and After the 2013 Fiscal Reform 
 Pre-reform Post-reform 
 Up to 2012 2013 2014 From 2015 
Regimen General 5% on turnover 5% for monthly 
turnover up to 
Q30,000; 
6% for turnover in 
excess Q30,000 
5% for monthly 
turnover up to 
Q30,000; 
7% for turnover in 
excess Q30,000 
5% for monthly 
turnover up to 
Q30,000; 
7% for turnover in 
excess Q30,000 
Regimen Optativo 31% on profits 31% on profits 28% on profits 25% on profits 
Source:  Superintendencia de Administración Tributaria 
 
 
Table 3.2 – Summary Statistics for Firms under Regimen General and Regimen Optativo 
Indicator 
Full 
Sample 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Observations 414,189 61,923 65,399 68,135 70,470 73,223 75,039 
Share in Regimen 
General 
53.0% 52.3% 53.0% 54.0% 52.8% 52.9% 52.7% 
Related by accountant 80.4% 79.3% 80.0% 80.5% 80.9% 81.3% 80.0% 
Related by legal 
representative 
51.0% 48.9% 49.9% 50.7% 51.8% 52.5% 51.8% 
Related by accountant 
and legal 
representative 
28.4% 27.0% 27.6% 28.0% 28.9% 29.5% 29.2% 
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Table 3.3 – Summary baseline difference-in-difference estimates, by network type 
 
By accountant 
(1) 
By legal representative 
(2) 
By acc. & legal rep. 
(3) 
𝛽3 
0.0115*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0079*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0107*** 
(0.0023) 
Observations 362,578 322,052 347,821 
Treated 281,280 119,113 51,387 
Parallel trends 
coefficient 
(Placebo reform model) 
-0.0008 
(0.0020) 
0.0036** 
(0.0016) 
0.0008 
(0.0020) 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant 
at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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APPENDIX A. Supplementary material for Chapter 1 
A.1. Model with turnover and cost misreporting 
A.1.1. Profit maximization under a pure profits tax 
The basic model presented in Section 2 can be extended to account for turnover misreporting.  In 
this case, the tax liability faced by firms, 𝑇(?̂?, ?̂?),  depends on both reported turnover, ?̂?, and 
reported cost, ?̂?.   Private costs of evasion,  ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)),  depend on misreported turnover 
and misreported costs.  Hence, the firm’s problem is now, 
 max
𝑦,?̂?, 𝑐̂ 
 𝑦 − 𝑐(𝑦) − 𝑇(?̂?, ?̂?) − ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)). (A1) 
For the case of a pure profits tax, the tax liability function becomes  𝑇(?̂?, ?̂?) = 𝜏𝜋(?̂? − ?̂?).  
The firm’s first order conditions for an interior solution are, 
 𝑐′(𝑦)[1 − ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦))] = 1 − ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) (A2) 
 ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 𝜏𝜋  (A3) 
 ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 𝜏𝜋. (A4) 
Optimal turnover misreporting is governed by equation (A3), while optimal cost 
misreporting is determined by equation (A4).  Combining all the conditions above yields, 
 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1. (A5) 
This condition keeps the feature of a non-distortionary pure profits tax. 
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A.1.2. Profit maximization under a turnover tax 
In the context of turnover and cost misreporting, the tax liability function takes the form  𝑇(?̂?, ?̂?) =
𝜏𝑦?̂?.  The first order conditions for an interior solution to this problem are, 
 𝑐′(𝑦)[1 − ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦))] = 1 − ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) (A6) 
 ℎ𝑦−?̂?(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 𝜏𝑦, (A7) 
 ℎ𝑐̂−𝑐(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦)) = 0, (A8) 
which together imply, 
 𝑐′(𝑦) = 1 − 𝜏𝑦. (A9) 
 As in the simplified model, a turnover tax has a distortionary effect, since equation (A9) 
relates the optimal output level to the tax rate.  Thus, output will be lower than under a profits tax, 
and so will total evasion.  The main difference with the simplified model is that now turnover 
misreporting still occurs, despite cost misreporting being zero.  However, given that 
ℎ(𝑦 − ?̂?, ?̂? − 𝑐(𝑦))  is a convex function of the amount being evaded, and as long as  𝜏𝜋 > 𝜏𝑦, a 
firm facing a turnover tax will be expected to misreport a lower amount of turnover than under a 
pure profits tax.  In practice, this condition is often verified.  For instance, for the Guatemalan 
setting  𝜏𝜋 ≫ 𝜏𝑦, since  𝜏𝜋 = 31%  and  𝜏𝑦 = 0.93%. 
A.1.3. Profit maximization under a minimum tax 
With turnover misreporting, the typical income tax liability function under a minimum tax 
has the form, 
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 𝑇(?̂?, ?̂?) = max{𝜏𝜋(?̂? − ?̂?), 𝜏𝑦?̂?}. (A10) 
Equation (8) indicates that a firm faces the largest tax liability between a profit tax and a turnover 
tax.  For a given combination of reported turnover and reported cost, (?̂?, ?̂?), the two liabilities are 
equal when, 
 𝜏𝜋(?̂? − ?̂?) =  𝜏𝑦?̂?         ⇔         ?̂? ≡
(?̂?−𝑐̂)
?̂?
=  
𝜏𝑦
𝜏𝜋
. (A11) 
Hence,  ?̂?  is now defined in terms of reported turnover and reported cost, instead of actual 
turnover, as before.  Given this threshold, firms with a reported profit margin above or equal to  
𝜏𝑦/𝜏𝜋  will face the incentives shown in section A.1, while firms with a reported profit margin 
below this threshold will behave as described in section A.2.  
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A.2. Optimality conditions under Regimen Optativo 
Equation (16), copied below, states the firm’s problem under Regimen Optativo, 
 max
𝑦, 𝑐?̂?𝑂𝐺𝑆, 𝑐?̂? 
 𝑦 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦) − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦) − 𝑇(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆, ?̂?𝑜) − ℎ(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦)).  
In this setting, firms choose output, reported COGS and reported other costs to maximize their 
after-tax profits.  The cost of evasion function, ℎ(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦)), considers 
misreporting of both types of cost.  Assuming that the total cost function can be expressed as  
𝑐(𝑦) = 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦) + 𝑐𝑜(𝑦), this model yields the following optimality conditions, 
 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
′ (𝑦) [1 − ℎ𝑐?̂?𝑜𝑔𝑠−𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑠(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦))] 
 + 𝑐𝑜
′ (𝑦)[1 − ℎ𝑐?̂?−𝑐𝑜(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦))] = 1 − 𝑇𝑦(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆, ?̂?𝑜) (B1) 
 ℎ𝑐?̂?𝑜𝑔𝑠−𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑔𝑠(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦)) = −𝑇𝑐?̂?𝑜𝑔𝑠(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆, ?̂?𝑜) (B2) 
 ℎ𝑐?̂?−𝑐𝑜(?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 − 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆(𝑦), ?̂?𝑜 − 𝑐𝑜(𝑦)) = −𝑇𝑐?̂?(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆, ?̂?𝑜), (B3) 
which are similar in nature to those shown in the theoretical section.  The main difference arises 
from the fact that there are now two optimality conditions regarding cost misreporting.  
 Under a pure profit tax, the optimality conditions imply,16 
 𝑐′(𝑦) = 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
′ (𝑦) +  𝑐𝑜
′ (𝑦) = 1, (B4) 
while under turnover taxation, this changes to, 
 𝑐′(𝑦) = 𝑐𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆
′ (𝑦) +  𝑐𝑜
′ (𝑦) = 1 − 𝜏𝑦. (B5) 
                                                          
16 This is because, under a pure profit tax, 𝑇𝑦(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 , ?̂?𝑜) = −𝑇𝑐?̂?𝑜𝑔𝑠(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 , ?̂?𝑜) = −𝑇𝑐?̂?(𝑦, ?̂?𝐶𝑂𝐺𝑆 , ?̂?𝑜) = 𝜏𝜋. 
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Therefore, the general conclusions of the analysis of firms’ responses, described in Section 2, 
remain largely unchanged. 
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A.3. Supplementary Tables and Figures 
Table A.1 – Estimated evasion responses at the MTS payment threshold using Non-exempt firms  
to derive the counterfactual density distribution 
 
Observed responses 
Model 
without 
Evasion  
Model with Evasion 
(values show change in misreporting  
in % of reported profits) 
 
Bunching 
(𝑏) 
Profit 
Margin 
Response 
(∆?̂?) 
Estimated 
Output 
Elasticity 
(𝜀𝑦) 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 0 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 0.5 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 1 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 5 
Given 
𝜀𝑦 = 10 
Non-Exempt Firms 5.69 0.57 20.38 18.95 18.49 18.02 14.30 9.65 
Ratio of reported-
to-actual profits 
(upper-bound) 
   0.84 0.84 0.85 0.87 0.91 
 
  
Figure A.1 – Bunching Estimation for Non-exempt Firms at the MTS payment threshold using the standard 
bunching methodology.  The figure above illustrates the empirical density of the profit margin (in % of turnover) for 
non-exempt firms, using a bin size of 0.1.  The counterfactual density shown corresponds to that estimated from the 
empirical density of non-exempt firms, as opposed to exemption-eligible firms.  The estimated excess mass in this 
figure comes from the difference between the depicted densities in the range enclosed by the dashed vertical lines. 
  
b = 5.69 
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APPENDIX B. Supplementary material for Chapter 2 
Table B.1 – List of countries included in the analysis
Afghanistan 
Albania 
Algeria 
Angola  
Argentina  
Armenia  
Australia  
Austria  
Azerbaijan  
Bahrain  
Bangladesh  
Barbados  
Belarus  
Belgium  
Belize  
Benin  
Bhutan  
Bolivia  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  
Botswana  
Brazil  
Brunei Darussalam  
Bulgaria  
Burkina Faso  
Burundi  
Cabo Verde  
Cambodia  
Cameroon  
Canada  
Central African Republic  
Chad  
Chile  
China  
Colombia  
Comoros  
Costa Rica  
Croatia  
Cyprus  
Czech Republic  
Côte d'Ivoire  
Democratic Republic of the Congo  
Denmark  
Djibouti  
Dominican Republic  
Ecuador  
Egypt  
El Salvador  
Equatorial Guinea  
Eritrea  
Estonia  
Ethiopia  
FYR Macedonia  
Fiji  
Finland  
France  
Gabon  
Georgia  
Germany  
Ghana  
Greece  
Grenada  
Guatemala  
Guinea  
Guinea-Bissau  
Guyana  
Haiti  
Honduras  
Hungary  
Iceland  
India  
Indonesia  
Iraq  
Ireland  
Iran  
Israel  
Italy  
Jamaica  
Japan  
Jordan  
Kazakhstan  
Kenya  
Korea  
Kuwait  
Kyrgyz Republic  
Lao P.D.R.  
Latvia  
Lebanon  
Lesotho  
Liberia  
Libya  
Lithuania  
Luxembourg  
Madagascar  
Malawi  
Malaysia  
Maldives  
Mali  
Malta  
Mauritania  
Mauritius  
Mexico  
Moldova  
Morocco  
Mozambique  
Myanmar  
Namibia  
Nepal  
Netherlands  
New Zealand  
Nicaragua  
Niger  
Nigeria  
Norway  
Oman  
Pakistan  
Panama  
Papua New Guinea  
Paraguay  
Peru  
Philippines  
Poland  
Portugal  
Republic of Congo  
Russia  
Rwanda  
Samoa  
Saudi Arabia  
Senegal  
Sierra Leone  
Singapore  
Slovak Republic  
Slovenia  
Solomon Islands  
South Africa  
South Sudan  
Spain  
Sri Lanka  
St. Lucia  
Sudan  
Suriname  
Swaziland  
Sweden  
Switzerland  
Syria  
Taiwan 
Tajikistan  
Tanzania  
Thailand  
The Bahamas  
The Gambia  
Togo  
Trinidad and Tobago  
Tunisia  
Turkey  
Turkmenistan  
Uganda  
Ukraine  
United Arab Emirates  
United Kingdom  
United States  
Uruguay  
Uzbekistan  
Vanuatu  
Venezuela  
Vietnam  
Yemen  
Zambia  
Zimbabwe
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APPENDIX C. Supplementary material for Chapter 3 
 
Table C.1 – Baseline difference-in-difference estimates 
 
By accountant 
(1) 
By legal representative 
(2) 
By acc. & legal rep. 
(3) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.0082 
(0.0076) 
0.0097* 
(0.0051) 
0 .0186** 
(0.0089) 
𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 0.0025 
(0.0020) 
0.0054*** 
(0.0012) 
0.0066*** 
(0.0010) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 × 𝑟𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚 0.0115*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0079*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0107*** 
(0.0024) 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 -2.05e-10*** 
(5.29e-11) 
-1.88e-10*** 
(3.92e-11) 
-1.98e-10*** 
(5.08e-11) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.5204*** 
(0.0059) 
0.5101*** 
(0.0020) 
0 .5082*** 
(0.0014) 
Observations 362,578 322,052 347,821 
Treated 281,280 119,113 51,387 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant 
at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
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Table C.2 – Generalized difference-in-difference estimates 
 
By accountant 
(1) 
By legal representative 
(2) 
By acc. & legal rep. 
(3) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 0.0059 
(0.0076) 
0.0102** 
(0.0051) 
0.0164* 
(0.0088) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2010 -0.0197*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0147*** 
(0.0013) 
-0.0176*** 
(0.0010) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2010 0.0004 
(0.0024) 
-0.0054** 
(0.0021) 
-0.0021 
(0.0027) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2011 -0.0123*** 
(0.0017) 
-0.0093*** 
(0.0010) 
-0.0108*** 
(0.0009) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2011 0.0010 
(0.0019) 
-0.0016 
(0.0016) 
0.0014 
(0.0019) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2013 -0.0084*** 
(0.0018) 
-0.0039*** 
(0.0011) 
-0.0033*** 
(0.0009) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2013 0.0111*** 
(0.0020) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0017) 
0.0103*** 
(0.0020) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2014 -0.0073*** 
(0.0022) 
-0.0002 
(0.0013) 
-0.0010 
(0.0010) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2014 0.0131*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0045** 
(0.0020) 
0.0097*** 
(0.0024) 
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2015 -0.0070*** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0018 
(0.0014) 
-0.0023* 
(0.0011) 
𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 × 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟2015 0.0126*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0071*** 
(0.0022) 
0.0126*** 
(0.0028) 
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 -2.08e-10*** 
(5.34e-11) 
-1.91e-10*** 
(3.96e-11) 
-2.01e-10*** 
(5.12e-11) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 0.5320*** 
(0.0060) 
0.5183*** 
(0.0020) 
0 .5175*** 
(0.0015) 
Observations 362,578 322,052 347,821 
Treated 281,280 119,113 51,387 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at the firm level. * significant at 10% level; ** significant 
at 5% level; *** significant at 1% level. 
 
